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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background
1.1 Hate Speech in the EU and the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. Project
Fabienne H. Baider, Stavros Assimakopoulos and Sharon Millar
Migration phenomena characterised by a large influx of populations can question
our conception of territories and social relations. Since this conception is part and
parcel of our identity, migration has the power to trigger political discourses on
identity issues. One such occasion has indeed been unravelling lately, especially
since the summer of 2015, with the arrival in the European Union (henceforth EU)
of migrants from a variety of places, and in particular from regions in conflict, such
as Syria, Libya or Iraq, countries under totalitarian regimes, such as Erythrea, as
well as countries with high levels of poverty, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. As a
result, Europe has been politically and socially shaken: photos of thousands of
migrants roaming across Europe have made the news, and such media images have
been instrumentalised to serve different, often far-right, political agendas.
The question of refugees—and more broadly migrants—and their integration in
Europe has been in the spotlight, with media discourse being on the whole alarmist,
with an iteration of expressions like a ‘huge migration crisis’, ‘waves of migrants
flooding the EU’ and a focus on violence and threat as the main outcome of such
arrivals (cf. UNHCR 2016). In turn, Europe is witnessing the growth of national-
ism, with violent reactions being related to the feelings of insecurity, fear or anger,
and several xenophobic political parties, such as Golden Dawn in Greece or AfD
(Alternative for Germany) in Germany feeding these feelings of anxiety and
resentment to attract voters. Finally, recent reports still indicate that the migration
issue continues to be one of the major preoccupations of European citizens (cf.
European Commission 2016a).
Indeed, the 2016 report of the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance observed a sharp increase in hate crime while also noting that “racist
insults have become increasingly common and xenophobic hate speech has reached
© The Author(s) 2017
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unprecedented levels” (ECRI 2017: 9, italics our own). At the same time, both
researchers and NGOs have repeatedly noted how Web 2.0 has facilitated the global
spread of hate. For example, the latest Shadow Report by the European Network
Against Racism (ENAR 2016) has pointed out a rise in racist discourse both on
social media and the internet. In response to the situation, the EU has encouraged
several initiatives with a view to containing both hate speech and hate crime within
its remit. Legal provisions (cf. Sect. 1.1) foresee penalties for those publicly
inciting to racial hatred, while the European Agency of Fundamental Rights has
deﬁned within the Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia the following
priorities:
• the identiﬁcation of hate crime,
• the increasing use of the internet as a tool of hate and propaganda,
• the under-reporting of hate crime,
• the rise of extremist groups and political parties in the EU.
(FRA 2013).
The C.O.N.T.A.C.T.1 project (2015–2017), which was co-funded by the Rights,
Equality & Citizenship Programme of the European Commission
Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (JUST/2014/RRAC/AG), sought to
address the above priorities by combining complementary expertise from academics
and experienced NGOs working in the area across a number of EU member states,
namely Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain
and the United Kingdom. To this end, under the central coordination of the
University of Cyprus and, more speciﬁcally, Professor Fabienne H. Baider, C.O.N.
T.A.C.T. partners have engaged in a number of activities, which to a great extent
follow Ramalingam’s (2012: 11–13) categorisation of measures that would effec-
tively target far-right extremism. These include:
– up-stream preventative measures, such as the collection and scientiﬁc analysis
of data that will help better understand the context of hate speech online, as well
as the development of training sessions targeted at relevant stakeholders (police,
youth and media) with a view to building a stronger civil society.
– reactive measures and response mechanisms, such as the establishment of a
dedicated web platform and phone app for reporting hate incidents.
– intervention through the training of the relevant stakeholders and the organi-
sation of awareness-raising events.2
Against this background, the present volume is an attempt to collectively report on
some research that several C.O.N.T.A.C.T. partners undertook as part of their
involvement with the project. Even though hate speech is a hotly debated topic in
1C.O.N.T.A.C.T. stands for ‘Creating an On-line Network, monitoring Team and phone App to
Counter hate crime Tactics’.
2For more information about the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project, visit our website at: http://www.
reportinghate.eu.
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legal and policy-making circles, the relatively little attention it has received by
researchers of linguistic pragmatics and discourse analysis is arguably dispropor-
tionate to its social relevance and importance. In this respect, the main aim of this
volume is to showcase that an implementation of certain research methodologies that
linguists, andmore speciﬁcally discourse analysts, have at their disposal can fruitfully
contribute to the better understanding of a phenomenon that, as we saw, is becoming
increasingly widespread these days. In light of this, the contents of the present volume
should be approached as more of a ‘proof of concept’ demonstration, rather than an
exhaustive analysis of hate speech in the EU. The reason for this is simple: as
McGonagle (2013: 3) points out even though the term ‘hate speech’ is often incor-
porated, at least as a notion, into legal and policy documents, there is still no uni-
versally accepted deﬁnition for it, which on its ownwarrants further investigation into
the ways in which hate, in the relevant sense, is both expressed and perceived.
Generally speaking, hate speech could be described as the expression of hatred
towards an individual or group of individuals on the basis of protected charac-
teristics, where the term ‘protected characteristics’ denotes membership to some
speciﬁc social group that could, on its own, trigger discrimination (cf. OSCE/
ODIHR3 2009: 37–46). What these protected characteristics are, however, remains
open to interpretation, with different states including different categories under this
rubric, as will be discussed in more detail in the following section of this intro-
ductory chapter. Just to give an example, the EU deﬁnition of hate speech that is put
forth in the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 2008 conﬁnes hate
speech to “all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a
group of persons or a member of such a group deﬁned by reference to race, colour,
religion, descent or national or ethnic origin” (Council of the European Union
2008), essentially leaving out of the equation such characteristics as sex, gender
identity and sexual orientation.
As Baider (2017) notes, however, in an attempt to deﬁne ‘hate speech’ more
broadly, one could follow the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which does not single out any particular protected characteristics and instead pro-
poses that hate speech essentially amounts to an “advocacy of discriminatory
hatred which constitutes incitement to hostility, discrimination or violence” (UN
General Assembly 1966, our italics; see also OHCHR 2013). While the question of
how to exactly interpret the words ‘hatred’, ‘discrimination’, ‘violence’ and ‘hos-
tility’ in this deﬁnition still remains open, it manages to express more concretely the
forms that the expression of hatred, in the relevant sense, may take. What is more
important here, however, is the word ‘incitement’, which takes centre stage and
renders the intention to trigger potential actions against members of protected
groups a precondition for considering a speech act hate speech, assuming, thus, a
link between hate speech and hate crime, with the former presumably leading to the
latter.
3Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Ofﬁce for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights.
1.1 Hate Speech in the EU and the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. Project 3
This signiﬁcance of intention in identifying hate speech should be enough to
justify the potentially critical contribution that research in linguistic pragmatics, and
more speciﬁcally discourse analysis, could make towards delineating the term at
hand, since pragmatic inquiry by deﬁnition revolves around the speciﬁcation of
speaker-intended meaning. After all, research in the ﬁeld has shown that implicitly
communicated meaning can lead to action as much as—and maybe even more than
—overtly expressed meaning. This is precisely why any legal deliberation, both
within the remit of hate speech/crime laws and beyond, squarely depends on the
way in which a judicial body interprets both law and evidence.4
This brings us to what is probably the thorniest issue in approaching hate speech
from a discourse analytic perspective. This would be the discrepancy between the
legal understanding of the term and the multiple—and concealed—forms that the
expression of hate can take. Taking, for example, the aforementioned Council
Framework Decision, one could isolate the criteria qualifying speech as hate speech
in the EU as follows:
1. A call motivated by racial/ethnic/national bias;
2. A call for violence;
3. A call punishable by the criminal law of the country where it occurs.
Legally speaking, it is only speech that lies at the intersection of these three criteria
that would qualify as illegal, and thus prosecutable hate speech in this context. Still,
there could still be cases of inflammatory, offensive comments or comments
characterised by prejudice and intolerance that would not meet the threshold pro-
vided in the description above. And even though such cases of general dispar-
agement, viliﬁcation and abusive language may not be considered hate speech in
the legal sense, they arguably still constitute hate speech in that they may have a
devastating effect on their recipients on the grounds of moral harassment—which
has, for instance, been conducive to suicide on several occasions.5
In this regard, there seem to be two different categories of hate speech. On the
one hand, there is what could be called hard hate speech, which comprises pros-
ecutable forms that are prohibited by law, and on the other, there is soft hate speech,
which is lawful but raises serious concerns in terms of intolerance and discrimi-
nation. As we will see in the section that follows, the threshold for distinguishing
between hard and soft hate speech (especially in relation to protected characteris-
tics) varies from country to country. On top of this, different democracies have
altogether different approaches towards regulating and combating hate speech. So,
while the USA, at governmental level, gives priority to the protection of the free-
dom of expression and opinion, many EU member states do invoke measures to
4Even though their potential role in Social Justice DG programs has not yet been yet acknowl-
edged, forensic linguistics techniques have repeatedly been used in/applied to court cases related to
hate speech and sexist, racist discourse (cf. Carney 2014; Olsson and Luchjenbroers 2013;
Coulthard and Johnson 2017).
5For an in-depth overview of the effects of cyberbullying for LGBTQ youth, see Abreu and Kenny
(2017).
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regulate and combat hate speech. Given this volume’s motivation and method-
ological angle then, we will not be addressing the distinction between legal and
illegal hate speech here. Rather, we will be focusing on the features of discourse
that encompasses a discriminatory attitude as a means of identifying different ways
in which hate, broadly construed, is expressed in spontaneous online comments.
Discrimination has been a widely studied topic in discourse-analytic theorising,
which investigates the signiﬁcance of language in the production, maintenance,
resistance and change of social relations of power, through mainly the ideological
workings of political and media discourse (Fairclough 1989; van Leeuwen and
Wodak 1999; Halliday 1989). Through its iteration, discriminatory discourse
‘manufactures’ assumptions, legitimises dominance and naturalises inequality.
Different approaches in discourse analysis such as discursive psychology or critical
discourse analysis have developed concepts that can be particularly useful in
understanding the relationship between linguistic practices and social structures,
and help provide links between language use and processes of social change that
take place outside discourse. At the same time, these latter processes have been
shown to be substantively shaped by relevant discourses (Chouliaraki and
Fairclough 1999: 4). In this respect, discourse analysis is key when it comes to
social change, as discourse shapes political decisions and deﬁnes what WE are (i.e.
who we are and what we can do or not), as well as what is acceptable or not by
linguistically attributing characteristics to people, events or practices, and in effect
bringing people to accept or at least rationalise the unacceptable (like, for example,
the use of metaphors like COCKROACHES or PARASITES when discussing migrants).
Fairclough (1989), for example, blends Foucault’s (1971, 1975) formulations of
“orders of discourse” and “power-knowledge”, Gramsci’s notion (1971) of
“hegemony” and Althusser’s (1971) concept of “ideological state apparatuses” to
describe discourse as an accepted flow of common knowledge (discourse) about
which we have assumptions (thoughts) and on which we make decisions (actions).
In this perspective, a discourse-analytic approach to Othering processes is funda-
mental for an understanding of the actions taken against minorities, whether these
are sexual or social.
At the same time, critical discourse analysis has as its focus the relationship
between ideology, inequality, and power through discourse, analysing them on the
basis of “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, dis-
crimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak 1995: 204).
One of its main tenets is that social interaction (partially) takes a linguistic form.
This critical approach is distinct from other approaches to discourse analysis in its
view of (a) the relationship between language and society and (b) the relationship
between analysis and the practices analysed (Wodak 1997: 173). It places the focus
on the linguistic features and organisation of concrete instances of discourse, such
as the choices and patterns in vocabulary or rhetorical ﬁgures (e.g. metaphors,
wording), grammar (e.g. transitivity, modality), cohesion (e.g. conjunctions, ana-
phors, etc.). For example, the use of passive voice in news reporting the deportation
of migrants or an assault to a transgender person can have the effect of obscuring
the agent(s) of the relevant processes and therefore minimise accountability. Some
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critical discourse analysts combine (quantitative) corpus linguistics and (qualitative)
textual analysis techniques. Their addition of quantitative measures is motivated by
the belief that a focus on the distribution of linguistic forms is an empirically
reliable means for uncovering the linguistic processes through which Othering is
socially materialised, as such quantitative data can help understand the relationship
between “social structure and individual subjectivity and the ways in which lan-
guage mediates between the two” (Levon and Mendes 2017: 15).
Wodak and her associates have also developed the critical and historical dis-
course analysis strand with the intention of tracing the (intertextual) history of
phrases and arguments on a given topic (Wodak 1995; van Leeuwen and Wodak
1999). The method consists in triangulating sources, i.e. in using different docu-
ments to analyse the same phenomenon, ethnographic research and analysing news
reporting. This triangulation aims to understand a particular phenomenon from
different standpoints.
The analyses which follow in the following chapters are mostly based on such
discourse analytic approaches. For example, as will become evident in the
remainder of this volume, the triangulation methodology has been used as a basis
for the research carried out within the CONTACT project. More speciﬁcally, taking
into account the relevant EU laws on discriminatory discourse and hate speech, we
analysed comments posted on main news portals, and carried out interviews and
administered questionnaires so as to understand the public perception of discrimi-
natory statements with a view to reaching a broader understanding of the kinds of
Othering discourses that are circulated in the European space.
Since this volume focuses on the EU, however, it seems necessary to ﬁrst briefly
outline some of the differences that countries that are represented in the C.O.N.T.A.
C.T. project exhibit in their understanding and regulation of hate speech issues,
before moving on to the particularities of the online setting as a locus for the
expression of hate.
1.2 Regulating Hate Speech in the EU
Natalie Alkiviadou
Notwithstanding the perplexities associated with deﬁning hate speech as a result of
the free speech debate, the EU managed, after seven long years of negotiations
(European Commission 2014: 1), to take a major leap forward in 2008 with its
Framework Decision on Combatting Racism and Xenophobia through Criminal
Law (Council of the European Union 2008). As is reflected in its title, this is not a
document dealing with hate speech per se but, instead, with some of the phenomena
underlying such speech. However, it was hate speech that kept the negotiations
going for so many years and, particularly, the signiﬁcant divergences in the legal
traditions of EU member states vis-à-vis free speech (European Commission 2014:
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1). These varying understandings of hate speech also mean that, regardless of the
Framework Decision at the EU level, there is little coherence amongst EU member
states on the deﬁnition of hate speech. To this end, in February 2017, the European
Parliament put forth a motion for a resolution on establishing a common legal
deﬁnition of hate speech in the EU (European Parliament 2017).
In light of this, this section will consider the main characteristics of the legal
frameworks of the ten countries participating in the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project.6 This
will allow us to see how hate speech is approached on a decentralised (member-state)
level and determine possible convergences and divergences amongst the member
states themselves. Before moving on, however, it is worth noting that the term ‘hate
speech’ is not found in any of the legislations of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project partner
countries; rather, all these countries transposed or acceded to the United Nation’s
ICCPR (UN General Assembly 1966) and ICERD (UN General Assembly 1965),
with the UK making a reservation to the relevant articles on the grounds of free
speech. As will be demonstrated below, regardless of the ratiﬁcation or accession to
the aforementioned UN documents, the transposing laws are not the ones habitually
relied upon to tackle hate speech. A relevant example is Denmark, where a court was
faced with the statement ‘negroes are less intelligent than Europeans’, which falls
within the framework of statements pertaining to racial superiority, prohibited by the
ICERD; yet, this was deemed to be permissible speech, as it was made as part of a
political debate.7 With this in mind, we can now turn to the legal provisions of each
C.O.N.T.A.C.T. partner country in alphabetical order below.
The main anti-hate speech legislation in Cyprus is The Combatting Certain
Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by means of Criminal Law 134
(I) of 2011, which transposed the Framework Decision into national law. Cyprus
chose to incorporate the provision of punishing only conduct which is either carried
out in a manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or
insulting. Cyprus went a step further from the protected characteristics of the
supra-national level and also passed Law 87 (I)/2015 amending the Criminal Code.
This amendment incorporates Article 99A into the Criminal Code, which punishes
hate speech targeted at a person or person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. In
sum, there is no explicit deﬁnition of hate speech in Cyprus but, instead, a trans-
position of supra-national documents which offer their own appraisals of hate
speech and which set out varying thresholds. This results in a discordant legal
setting which, nevertheless, has the positive feature of going beyond the hierarchy
of hate embraced by the supra-national framework by incorporating the grounds of
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected characteristics in the sphere of
hate speech. Still, the above legislation has not yet been used in Court and there is
no national case-law relevant to the issue of hate speech.
6It should be noted that the information provided in this section in relation to each member state’s
national context has been synthesised from the desktop research conducted by C.O.N.T.A.C.T.
partners in each member state during the ﬁrst stages of the project, rather than this section’s author.
7Judgment no. 1.4.8, Western High Court.
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In Denmark, hate speech is connected to Section 266b of the Danish Penal Code
which criminalises expressions that “publicly or with intent to disseminate to a
wider circle, threaten, insult or degrade a group of persons on the basis of race, skin
colour, nationality, ethnicity, faith or sexual orientation”. Evidently, this deﬁnition
is more extensive than its supra-national counterparts, as it includes grounds such as
sexual orientation. Important to this understanding of hate speech is that expres-
sions must be made publicly or with an intention to disseminate to a wider circle,
and, therefore, private conversations do not fall within the prohibited sphere. Unlike
Cyprus, Denmark has relevant case-law which, inter alia, sheds light on the
meaning of terms used in Section 266b. For example, the statement ‘coloured
people like you are not allowed in my parents’ apartment’ which was uttered in a
nursing home, was not considered by a District Court to be punishable, as the
nursing home was deemed as not constituting a public place.8
In Greece, the main national legislation is Law No 927/1797 on punishing acts
or activities aimed at racial discrimination, as amended by Law 4285/2014 that
implements the Framework Decision. Article 1 deals with public incitement to
violence, hatred or discrimination against a person or group of persons due to their
race, colour, religion, status, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or
disability if this poses a danger to public order or constitutes a threat to the life,
liberty or physical integrity of the person or persons involved and is punished with a
prison sentence ranging from three months to three years and with a monetary ﬁne
of ﬁve thousand to twenty thousand euros. The scope of protected characteristics of
this law is, together with Lithuania and Spain, discussed below, one of the most
extensive in the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. partner countries, incorporating grounds such as
disability, which is not found elsewhere. While there have been several relevant
cases before Greek courts, one characteristic example which demonstrates a
threshold that needs to be met, in terms of the impact of the speech and its publicity,
involved a Golden Dawn member. In this case, the defendant stated on camera that
‘we are ready to open the kilns. To make soaps. Not for the people, since… we may
fall sick …’ These were some of the phrases he used to refer to migrants. The court
decided that, even if these phrases were exaggerations, they demonstrated the
accused’s intention publicly to provoke people to cause harm to migrants, so that
the rest of them would be convinced to abandon Greece.9
The main relevant Italian Law is Law 205/1993 which makes it a crime to
“propagate ideas based on racial superiority or racial or ethnic hatred, or to instigate
to commit or commit acts of discrimination for racial, ethnic, national or religious
motives.” The law also punishes those who “instigate in any way or commit vio-
lence or acts of provocation to violence for racist, ethnic, national or religious
motives.” Although there are no strict thresholds to meet, such as public order, as is
the case of Cyprus for example, Italy limits itself to the protected characteristics of
ethnicity and religion, as provided for by the supra-national level.
8Judgment no. 1.4.6 The District Court (Hillerød).
9Decision 65738/2014 (Single-member Court of Athens).
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In Lithuania, the central provision dealing with this issue is Article 170 of the
Criminal Code entitled ‘Incitement against Any National, Racial, Ethnic, Religious
or Other Group of Persons.’ This article punishes the handling or distribution of
impugned material and expression, which incites hatred, violence, discrimination or
contempt for a person or persons belonging to a group deﬁned by sex, sexual
orientation, race, nationality, language, descent, social status, religion, convictions
or views. This deﬁnition is particularly broad including grounds such as sex but also
convictions, which are not necessarily afﬁliated with religion. Its threshold is also
low, with discriminatory expression also falling in the net of prohibited expression.
Interestingly, in relation to the punishment of expression (rather than material), the
article also renders ridiculing expression a punishable offence. It also punishes a
person who publicly incites violence against a person or persons of a particular
group. To give an example from case law, a defendant was found guilty for publicly
mocking a person of Asian origin in front of others with obscene epithets saying
that ‘foreigners are not welcome here.’10 This demonstrates the low threshold
necessary in Lithuania for ﬁnding speech hateful.
The central provision in Malta is Article 82 of the Maltese Criminal Code, which
punishes any person who
uses any threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written or
printed material which is threatening, abusive or insulting or otherwise conducts himself in
such a manner, with intent to stir up violence or racial hatred against another person or
group on the grounds of gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, race, colour, language,
ethnic origin, religion or belief or political or other opinion.
The protected characteristics are also broad in Malta, although not as broad as, for
example, Greece, which also incorporates the grounds of disability, Lithuania,
which also includes sex or as Romania and Spain discussed below.
In Romania, Article 369 of the Criminal Code prohibits “public incitement by
any means, hatred or discrimination against a class of persons.” Order 137 of 2000
sets outs the protected characteristics which are race, nationality, ethnicity, lan-
guage, religion, social, belief, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability,
non-contagious chronic disease, HIV infection and membership of a disadvantaged
group. This is the only country to incorporate HIV positive persons as protected by
hate speech legislation and which incorporates a broad ground of disadvantaged
groups. Moreover, by incorporating discrimination, the threshold of prohibition
remains low.
As for Spain, although, like for other countries, there is no legislative deﬁnition
of hate speech, the Constitutional Court held that hate speech is a “heavy burden of
hostility that incites, directly or indirectly, violence by way of humiliation.”11 The
main piece of legislation is Article 510 of the Criminal Code on the incitement to
hate crime, violence and discrimination. This punishes those who provoke dis-
crimination, hate or violence against groups or associations due to racist,
10Criminal case No. 1A-407-337/2009, Panevėžys district court.
11The Constitutional Court in its STC 176/1995 (Case Makoki).
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anti-Semitic reasons or any other reasons related to ideology, religion or belief,
family situation, belonging to an ethnic group or race, national origin, gender,
sexual preference, illness or handicap. The grounds for protected characteristics in
Spain are extensive and the thresholds low, incorporating, for example, discrimi-
nation and not requiring, for example, the disturbance of public order.
Turning to the UK, the Public Order Act 1986 provides that acts intended or
likely to stir up racial hatred include the use of words or behaviour or display of
written material, the publishing or distribution of written material, the public per-
formance of plays, the distribution, showing or playing of a recording and/or the
broadcasting of a programme in a cable programme service. The offence of stirring
up religious hatred has been deﬁned and incorporated into the 1986 Public Order
Act by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, with Sections 29B-F of the latter
addressing the issue of stirring up religious hatred in the same way as it does its
racial hatred counterpart. However, in relation to religious hatred, Section 29J of
the Racial and Religious Hatred Act stipulates that
nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts
discussion criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of par-
ticular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or
the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different
religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.
Therefore, in relation to religious hatred, the threshold is higher, since expression
such as insulting a particular religion is deemed permissible.
From the above approaches to hate speech and the variations therein, it could be
argued that, although some common elements can be discerned, “hate speech seems
to be whatever people choose it to mean” (Kiska 2012: 110) As we have seen in the
previous section, at the supra-national EU level, protected groups are limited to ethnic
and religious groups, demonstrating an adoption of a hierarchy of hate in such arenas,
with some characteristics perceived as simply being more important than others. At
the national level, countries such as Lithuania, Romania, Spain and Malta have an
extensive conceptualisation of protected groups whilst others such as Italy limit
themselves to those set out by the UN and the EU. The thresholds of what is con-
sidered prohibited speech also varies amongst countries, with Italy having a lower
threshold, prohibiting, for example, ideas of racial superiority, and Cyprus incorpo-
rating safety nets such as the impact of public disorder. On a last but important note,
these conceptual variations of deﬁnitions render effective challenging of online hate
on the borderless medium known as the internet particularly complex.
1.3 Hate Speech in the Online Setting
César Arroyo López and Roberto Moreno López
Following the technological revolution that began in the 1960s, the ever-growing
expansion of the internet since the 1990s has had considerable impact across the
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globe. Ultimately, we have gone from a system of information transmission
dominated by the mass media, state and lobbies, to a knowledge society where
citizens are not just information transmitters themselves but can also assume a more
active role, as creators and co-creators of new content. In the online world, a place
of global relations characterised by a dilution of space-time limitations, anyone with
online access can offer their opinion, contribute to dialogue and put forth their
knowledge and perceptions for the gestation of modern culture or “cyberculture”
(Sacristán 2013: 126). It is thus hard to dispute that the rapid expansion of the
internet has impacted and continues to impact societies at a micro-, meso- and
macro-scale.
Communication, including the production and sharing of information content, is
one of the core features of the internet. Yet, this type of digital communication is
marked by a number of particularities: the internet is a space that provides users
with the capacity for expressing their views and communicating without limits, and
typically (though not always) without control; the online setting makes it easy for
users to hide their identity (in whole or in part) and, in some cases, even to hide
their location and activity. As de Salvador Carrasco discusses, this anonymity is
“the ability to perform any access, communication or publication in the network
without third parties having the possibility to identify or locate the author of said
action,” although it is also true that such anonymity can only become a possibility
through the implementation of speciﬁc strategies and tools usually not known to
most educated laymen who use the internet (de Salvador Carrasco 2012: 2). Still,
even though most of the public communication that is produced online is essentially
traceable in origin, most users perceive the internet as a platform where they can
express themselves freely and anonymously. Interestingly, research conducted by
Childnet International in over 68 countries revealed that the experience of anony-
mous communication is one of the elements most sought after by young people, to
such an extent that they feel that the anonymous use of the internet should be
safeguarded, despite its potential dangers (Childnet 2013).
These characteristics of the worldwide web have encouraged a breeding ground
for the phenomenon of cyberhate, understood (in a non-restrictive way) as
any use of electronic communications technology to spread anti-Semitic, racist, bigoted,
extremist or terrorist messages or information. These electronic communications tech-
nologies include the internet (i.e., web-sites, social networking sites, ‘Web 2.0’
user-generated content, dating sites, blogs, online games, instant messages, and e-mail) as
well as other computer - and cell phone-based information technologies (Anti-Defamation
League 2010: 4).
Hence, due to its global, immediate and participatory nature, the internet has
become a space for both the expression and dissemination of intolerant ideas and
beliefs (Isasi and Juanatey 2016), offering an additional means of facilitating the
advocacy and spread of discrimination that can potentially even lead to hate crime.
Such attitudes and their expression reject difference and intend to deprive persons
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and groups of their dignity by denying and attacking their identity. It is these
intolerant attitudes that constitute one of the main manifestations of hate speech as a
social phenomenon, at least as far as the research reported in this volume is con-
cerned. Such soft hate speech as spread online can have a devastating effect on the
fabric of social order, as it potentially
not only negatively affects the groups or individuals that it targets; it also negatively
impacts those who speak out for freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination in our open
societies and has a chilling effect on the democratic discourse on online platforms
(European Commission 2016b: 1).
For example, a recent report in Spain (Ministerio del Interior 2016) pointed out that,
in the year 2016 alone, the Criminal Statistical Service identiﬁed 123 cases related
to hate speech which were passed on to law enforcement bodies, with more than
75% of these cases occurring on the internet or other ICT platforms. In a similar
vein, the Proxi Observatory analysed almost 5000 comments in three major digital
newspapers in Spain and concluded that more than half of the user comments that
appeared in response to news reported therein were intolerant in character (Cabo
et al. 2015: 16–23). All this was occurring at the same time when both the internet
and social networks were being used in Spain for explicit incitement to violence
against people on the basis of both their ethnic group (e.g. El Diario.es 2016) and
their sexual orientation (e.g. elPeriodico 2016).
Of course, this situation is not exclusive to Spain. Similar examples that can be
found in most countries around the globe suggest that intolerance and hate can
flourish on the internet, taking advantage of its very nature (Gagliardone et al.
2015). And even though the ‘terms of service’ of most relevant platforms, such as
Facebook, Yahoo! or Twitter do stipulate that it is prohibited to post content that is
“unlawful, harmful, libellous, vulgar, defamatory, obscene, tortuous, invasive of
one’s privacy, hateful, or racially ethnically or otherwise objectionable”
(Cohen-Almagor 2015: 163), the time it usually takes to remove such content has
been an issue of growing concern. This has recently led the EU Commission and
various social media giants to agree on a Code of conduct speciﬁcally targeting
illegal hate speech online (European Commission 2016b).
1.4 The C.O.N.T.A.C.T. Research Workstream
Stavros Assimakopoulos, Fabienne H. Baider and Sharon Millar
Having justiﬁed the focus of the present volume on online discourse in the EU, it is
now time to turn to the research on which it reports. As we will see in the following
chapter, which outlines the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. methodology, the basic source of data
for the more substantial part of our research was comments posted online in
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reaction to news reports related to migrants and members of the LGBTIQ com-
munity. While a comparative discussion of the results obtained in the different
national contexts is beyond the scope of the present volume, it seems necessary at
least provide a quick reference to our collective results so as to see whether dis-
criminatory discourse is an issue to look out for in the countries of the C.O.N.T.A.
C.T. consortium. As is evident from Table 1.1 above, which provides an overview
of the results obtained through our analysis of the relevant comments, it certainly
seems that both homophobia, and to a far greater extent, xenophobia are quite
prevalent in the EU. With the sole exception of Malta, where comments that view
members of the LGBTIQ community in a positive light outnumber comments that
reveal a negative disposition towards this group, all other national corpora show
that the commenter’s attitude towards both groups that were researched is more
negative than positive.
It is against this backdrop that the analytical chapters, which follow the
methodological overview in Chap. 2, are to be understood: Chap. 3 deals with the
analysis of online comments to news reports across a number of EU countries,
while Chap. 4 discusses some of our ﬁndings regarding the folk perception of hate
speech on the basis of a qualitative analysis of interviews that several C.O.N.T.A.C.
T. partners conducted with members of the general population. Since, as we have
already noted, the aim of this volume is to offer a panorama of the strategies most
commonly used to express what we have termed soft hate speech as well as an
overview of topics central to the way in which the general public perceives such
speech, the remarks put forth in each section of the analytical chapters are far from
conclusive; yet, they should be enough to justify the usefulness of insights from
linguistic pragmatics and discourse analysis when it comes to the analysis of hate
speech. And while the discussion of each topic therein is based on data collected in
a particular country’s context, it should easily become clear to the reader that it also
applies to the discussion of hate speech, broadly construed, transnationally.
Table 1.1 Results of comments polarity evaluation in the migration corpus per country
Country % of negative comments % of positive comments
Migration corpus LGBTIQ corpus Migration corpus LGBTIQ corpus
Cyprus 27.7 48.4 19.1 25.6
Denmarka 79.2 57 19.8 32
Greece 67.2 42.6 11.5 28
Italy 42.5 39 27.8 33
Lithuania 50.3 50 11.6 4.2
Malta 32.3 18.7 16.3 24.2
Poland 48.9 17.6 1.4 3
Spain 3.5 4.2 0.9 3.8
aThe high percentage of negative comments may be due to the predominance of comments from
the tabloid press in the Danish corpus
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Chapter 2
The C.O.N.T.A.C.T. Methodological
Approach
As already hinted at in the previous chapter, the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project covered
two main strands of research: the expression of hate speech and its perception. To
these ends, a multi-method approach was adopted, encompassing different types of
data. In this chapter, we will outline the shared procedures of data collection and
analysis in relation to both the production data, i.e. online comments to news
reports, and the perceptual data, i.e. interviews.
2.1 Harvesting and Analysing Online Comments to News
Reports
Sharon Millar, Fabienne H. Baider and Stavros Assimakopoulos
To investigate the expression of hate speech, the main source of data has been
user-generated content as found in what is known in media circles as “below the
line” comment ﬁelds on newspaper websites (Graham and Wright 2015: 139). The
reason for this was that while there is a sizeable literature on how minorities are
portrayed in the mainstream media,1 a lot less attention has been given to the ways
in which the general public reacts to this kind of discourse.2 And indeed, as we will
see in Chap. 3, the analysis of our collected data revealed a number of strategies
that are used by commenters on news portals to communicate a negative stance
toward the migrant and LGBTIQ minorities. However, given the multilingual
character of our project, even the initial harvesting of such online comments in an
1See, for example, van Dijk (1987, 1991), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Baker et al. (2008),
KhosraviNik (2010), KhosraviNik et al. (2012); as well as several papers in the Journal of
Language Aggression and Conflict (cf. Kopytowska 2015; Musolff 2017).
2But see Erjavec and Kovačič (2012), Brindle (2016), among others.
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attempt to compile manageable, and ultimately comparable databases for analysis in
each national context was a challenge in itself.
As a ﬁrst step, it was decided to use the publicly available Newsbrief web
application,3 developed by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. This
web portal monitors online news reporting across the globe in 60 different lan-
guages and hence was especially appropriate for a multilingual project like ours. Its
functionalities include the searching of archives using speciﬁc terms within des-
ignated time periods in countries and languages of one’s choice. The tool then
allows for a compilation of hits for keywords and from this, it is possible to search
for news articles that are accompanied by comments.
A pool of keywords within the thematic areas of the project was established and,
from this, partners selected those terms that were relevant for their national con-
texts. Many of these terms were shared across at least some partners, but to ensure
the possibility of comparison, all partners were required to include the following
keywords in their search: ‘homosexual(s)’, ‘immigrant(s)’, ‘lesbian(s)’, ‘LGBT’,
‘Muslim(s)’ and ‘refugee(s)’. Some partners carried out automated searches in more
than one language, either because the country has two ofﬁcial languages (e.g.
Maltese and English in Malta) or because of a speciﬁc interest in certain minority
languages within national borders (e.g. Russian in Lithuania).
The minimum number of keywords for the main themes of xenophobia and
homophobia/transphobia was six per theme. Monitoring was carried out over two,
non-consecutive time periods: 1.4.2015–30.6.2015 and 1.12.2015–29.02.2016.
This was done to include a period where the contemporary refugee crisis might be
less overwhelmingly predominant, at least in the media of some of the partner
countries. The number of hits for each keyword per month was registered to give a
quantitative mapping of what topics were most in focus in the media at the time.4
The Newsbrief tool provides no automated means to ﬁnd articles with comments
from the hits collected so this was approached manually. The baseline was that
partners checked all hits per keyword per month, but to a maximum of 100–120. In
cases where the number of hits exceeded this maximum, an appropriate ratio was
applied; for instance, if a keyword produced 500 hits in a month, then 1 in 5 hits
were checked. Following this method, most partners could ﬁnd more than an
adequate number of articles with comments, except for the Cypriot team, who
turned to the Facebook sites of the newspapers that are part of the Newsbrief
Cyprus database, and monitored reactions to the relevant articles there.
As the newspaper and comment data were to be analysed qualitatively, it was
decided for reasons of feasibility to restrict the databases to approximately 5000–
6000 words per keyword both for articles and for comments over the designated
6-month period. In cases where too many articles with too many comments had
3http://emm.newsbrief.eu/overview.html.
4Typically, across countries, issues to do with migration, immigrants and refugees dominated
across both time periods with noticeably fewer articles and reports on matters of sexual orientation
and gender identity.
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been found, certain sampling criteria were applied. Firstly, for each month, only the
week which attracted the most articles with comments for the keyword was
selected. If that single week still provided too many words for comments, then the
ﬁrst 300–500 words were taken, but without cutting short an individual comment or
comment thread. If the monthly word count for articles was exceeded, then those
articles that had only very few comments were dropped, as were articles that had
little actual relevance to the keyword.5 The objective was to obtain at least one
article with comments per keyword per month where possible. Once compiled, the
overall database for all keywords was checked for duplicate articles, which were
removed and, if necessary, replaced.
It should be emphasised that we make no claim of representativeness for any of
the partner databases. The Newsbrief web application, although comprehensive, has
inevitably its own inherent biases and during data collection, it became obvious that
certain newspapers, particularly the tabloids, tended to have articles with comments
while others rarely were sources of reader comments.
As with data collection, the qualitative analysis of the comments in the databases
was based around a common methodology, but partners were also free to subse-
quently develop their analyses further within their areas of expertise. We will
describe here the shared approach, which aimed to identify the evaluative language
used by authors towards the relevant target groups (immigrants, refugees, homo-
sexuals etc.). In this context, evaluation is understood as “the expression of the
speaker’s or writer’s attitude or stance towards, or view point on, or feelings about
the entities and propositions that he or she is talking about” (Thompson and
Hunston 2000: 5). While there are many aspects to evaluative language, the C.O.N.
T.A.C.T. focus was on negative and positive evaluative polarity (Alba-Juez and
Thompson 2014), which was then additionally related to speaker/writer strategies
operating at phrasal, sentential and discourse levels, in terms of linguistic forms
(e.g. lexical choice, metaphors, use of generics and argument strategies), as well as
pragmatic functions (e.g. insults, threats, jokes, stereotypes and counter stances).
To some extent, inspiration was taken from the EU-funded Light On project,6
which collected (and continues to collect) racist expressions, providing their source
and context as well as potential explanations as to why they are considered racist or
discriminatory. In a similar fashion, the qualitative analyses conducted as part of C.
O.N.T.A.C.T. also provided the discursive context, both in terms of the charac-
teristics of the newspaper (e.g. tabloid or broadsheet, political orientation) and the
interactional status of the comment (e.g. direct or tangential response to the article,
5For example, the Cypriot team had to disambiguate results for the keyword ‘refugee(s)’ as some
referred to Cypriot refugees in 1974, a common issue in Cypriot newspapers, rather than the 2015
refugees, while a much commented upon article that was retrieved for the keyword ‘black(s)’ in
Malta was an article about Darth Vader in Star Wars, which obviously has no connection to the
issue of xenophobia.
6Cross-community actions for combating the modern symbolism and languages of racism and dis-
crimination. For further information, visit http://www.lighton-project.eu/site/main/page/project-en.
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response to another contributor). In addition, the reasons for the polarity cate-
gorisations of expressions as more or less negative or positive (or ambiguous) were
stipulated by each group of analysts. In this way, what could be taken as subjective
categorisations were given a degree of transparency.
The shared analytical approach resulted in lists of expressions with their cate-
gorisations that permit cross-country comparisons at a general level.7 In this setting,
negatively-loaded expressions may be potential examples of hate speech as more
broadly or narrowly deﬁned whereas more positive-oriented language may exem-
plify counter speech. Obviously, more in-depth qualitative and quantitative anal-
yses were then undertaken by individual partners to shed more light on the
complexities of evaluative language (potential hate speech and counter speech) in
relation to the target minority groups. As will be seen in Chap. 3, these included the
use of corpus linguistic methods to investigate frequencies and collocational pat-
terns, qualitative approaches dealing with speciﬁc forms and functions as well as
interactional and co-constructional aspects of evaluative language use.
2.2 Approximating Perceptions of Hate
Sharon Millar, Fabienne H. Baider and Stavros Assimakopoulos
The second major strand of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. research was a study of how the
general public, and in particular young people belonging to the 18–35 age group,
perceive hate speech in the local context of each partner country. This strand
consisted of two phases. The ﬁrst involved the online administration of a ques-
tionnaire across the consortium, and the second, which took place after the analysis
of the questionnaire responses, comprised interviews intended to explore these
responses in more depth. This combination of questionnaires and interviews is
widely used in research wishing to capture broader perspectives and to pursue
issues of interest with more targeted and in-depth questions (Adams and Cox 2008).
Given this volume’s aim of providing an overview of matters pertaining to the
discourse analytic study of hate speech, the focus will be on the interview stage of
this research strand.8 Nonetheless, it is still necessary to provide an overview of the
7Even though such comparisons are beyond the scope of the present work, just to mention one
example, the use of the sickness and unnaturalness metaphors for homosexuality or
non-conditional threats against refugees (e.g. ‘torpedo the boats’, ‘electrify the fences’, etc.) was
present more or less across the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. datasets.
8Obviously, the interpretation of the questionnaire responses in each national context is also
meaningful in itself and we intend to return to it on some other occasion, but given space
limitations and, above all, the current volume’s focus on mainly qualitative-based discourse
analysis, we have decided to omit them from this section.
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questionnaire design in order to contextualise the results of the interview analysis
that follows in Chap. 4.
The questionnaire was intended to cover three major themes and comprised three
sections. Firstly, respondents were requested to evaluate six authentic examples
from each partner country’s collected data in terms of acceptability, by marking
their perceived acceptability on a 4-point Likert-type scale that included the options
‘acceptable’, ‘somewhat acceptable’, ‘less acceptable’ and ‘not acceptable’.
Each C.O.N.T.A.C.T. team selected three examples of negative polarity comments
relating to migrants and another three relating to the LGBTIQ community from
their national database. The examples for each category were chosen to represent
different degrees of extremeness, ranging, for example, from obvious threats to
insinuations. Finally, a further question asked whether the respondents would have
assessed the six presented examples differently if they had been written in private,
rather than public contexts online, for instance, in a private e-mail or during a casual
chat with friends. It was hoped that this question would give an indication of how
sensitive the general population is to the difference between public and private
discourse when it comes to the expression of hate.
The second section of the questionnaire aimed to examine the respondents’
attitudes towards—and experience of—reporting hate speech incidents. To con-
textualise the issue, we ﬁrst asked participants to share their own experiences of
hate speech as targets and as witnesses in their everyday life. Those participants
who stated that they have some experience of the sort were prompted to indicate the
place where the incident under question took place (i.e. at work, at school, in the
street, etc.). The respondents were then asked whether they would report such
incidents to the relevant authorities, and if they expressed unwillingness to do so,
they were given a list of options to indicate why this might be the case (e.g.
embarrassment, fear of reprisals, belief that police would not do anything, too much
trouble to report etc.).
Finally, the third part of the questionnaire sought to investigate the respondents’
perception of the concept ‘hate speech’ itself by asking them to indicate on a
6-point Likert-style scale the extent to which they agree with each of four deﬁni-
tions of hate speech that respectively equated the term with ‘making negative
prejudiced remarks’, ‘insulting’, ‘threatening’ or ‘encouraging other people to be
violent or show hatred’ towards people because of their race/nationality/ethnic
origins/religion/gender and/or sexual orientation.
Against this backdrop, the aim of the interviews was to follow up on the
questionnaire, by providing a better understanding of any interesting conclusions or
particular issues that arose from the analysis of the questionnaire responses.
Interviews were conducted either individually or in focus groups with young people
aged between 18 and 35 who were normally residents of each partner country.
Some of those interviewed had taken part in the questionnaire survey. At least 20
participants in total were interviewed per country (except for the UK, where only 12
took part in the interviews). Individual interviews lasted on average 15 min each,
while focus group sessions had an average duration of 45–60 min each. Interviews
were audio-recorded and transcribed orthographically.
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The interviews followed a semi-structured format, using an interview guide
which was structured around several themes to permit comparability across national
contexts. Starting off with a brief presentation of the acceptability ratings given for
the six examples of hate speech from the questionnaire, the interviewees were asked
to give their opinion as to why each example received the overall ratings that it did.
This was followed by a discussion of the concept of hate speech, which involved
consideration of both the deﬁnitions given in the questionnaire and the need to
legislate in relation to these deﬁnitions. A further theme covered was any experi-
ence interviewees may have had with hate speech or discriminatory discourse.
Interviewers were also free to gear the discussion towards other issues identiﬁed
from the analysis of the questionnaire responses as particularly important in the
national context concerned. Each session was concluded by asking participants if
they wished to add anything they deemed relevant to the discussion.
In terms of analysis, interviews were then subjected to “conventional content
analysis” which is used to identify categories, patterns and themes that emerge from
the data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279). Content analysis permits both qualitative
and quantitative approaches (Bengtsson 2016) and, as we will see in Chap. 4, while
the former was most generally adopted by partners, the latter was also used for
pattern analysis by the team from Cyprus.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of Online Comments to News
Reports
Having outlined the common methodological perspective that C.O.N.T.A.C.T.
partners adopted for both research strands of the project, it is now time to turn to a
general discussion of the results obtained. To this end, this chapter will focus on the
analysis of the comments corpora that were compiled at the ﬁrst stage of our
investigation; through the application of different techniques and against the
background of various theoretical standpoints, the following sections touch on
topics of central importance for the discourse-analytic discussion of hate speech,
broadly construed. More speciﬁcally, Sect. 3.1 discusses categorisation in the
context of Othering and its use as a means of defending one’s identity against the
perceived threat posed by minority groups in the Italian setting, with Sect. 3.2
building up on the topic of categorisation by zooming in on comments related to the
LGBTIQ community in Lithuania and discussing stereotyping as another strategy
for the expression of hate and discrimination. Moving on to the issue of xeno-
phobia, Sect. 3.3 explores the discursive dynamics of Polish online “patriotism”
and its interface with fear-mongering and incitement to hatred, while, remaining on
the topic, Sect. 3.4 highlights the use of conceptual metaphors in comments related
to migrants in Cyprus. Finally, turning to the discussion of indirectness in dis-
criminatory discourse, Sect. 3.5 focuses on implicitness as a commonly used way
of signalling an unfavourable stance towards minorities in Malta, and Sect. 3.6
examines the intricate ways in which constructed and ﬁctive dialogue are used to
legitimise xenophobic and homophobic discourse in the Danish context.
3.1 Categorisation and Defence Strategies
Ernesto Russo and Pablo Bernardino Tempesta
Categorisation is a fundamental human cognitive process which allows us to
recognise and understand reality, by grouping its objects into categories depending
© The Author(s) 2017
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on some meaningful criterion (Cohen and Claire Lefebvre 2005). When it comes to
the speciﬁc cognitive process of social categorisation, which divides individuals
into social groups (Allport 1979), it is typically undertaken on the basis of common
and shared characteristics of a group of people, as, for example, nationality, gender,
age, skin colour, religion, etc. This enables us to view the relevant people more as
members of a speciﬁc social group rather than as mere individuals.
In this respect, categorisation plays a key role in the process of stereotype-
forming and, as Mazzara discusses, by extension, prejudice-forming too:
It is evident how the concept of stereotype is extremely connected with prejudice, to such
an extent that it is both confused and associated with it. It is possible to claim that a
stereotype is the cognitive core of a prejudice, a set of information and beliefs related to a
particular category of objects [i.e. social groups etc.] elaborated into a unique, coherent,
stable image able to uphold and to create a prejudice against them. In other words, the
stereotype is able to funnel the evaluation of data into a prejudice.
(Mazzara 1997: 72, translation our own)
It follows then that mentally categorising individuals and/or behaviours into more
generic groupings paves the way for the shaping of mental beliefs, which are in turn
known as stereotypes, and which are sometimes formed on the basis of personal
(often hostile and harmful) opinions, called prejudice.
This process of generalisation gives rise to a mechanism of contrast in which one
tends to group together all those people with alike characteristics that one considers
to be incompatible with one’s own worldview (also known as Weltanschauung).
Through this latter process, which is generally known as Othering, a social group
becomes (mentally) classiﬁed as not belonging to the individual’s in-group by
means of a clear opposition (in terms of a characteristic like gender, nationality,
religion, etc.). This often takes the form of viliﬁcation and “denies the Other those
deﬁning characteristics of the ‘Same’, [such as] reason, dignity, love, pride, hero-
ism, nobility, and ultimately any entitlement to human rights” (Gabriel 2008: 213).
Connecting cognitive categorisation and stereotype-forming processes to the
development of hate manifestations (both in verbal and physical forms) towards
determined social groups, Bennett’s Developmental Model of Intercultural
Sensitivity (1993) offers a comprehensive account of the role that defence instincts
play here. As Castiglioni summarises (2005: 18–20), when a cognitive defence
strategy is activated, only the in-group is favourably considered and assumed to
stand above the other(s) in terms of intelligence, civilisation, historic roots, etc.
Everything else that forms part of the out-group is condemned because of fear,
which makes those in mental defence mode perceive themselves as being besieged.
In this setting, defence often takes the form of denigration where others are rep-
resented in a negative way, and attributed undesired characteristics through sim-
pliﬁcations based on limited knowledge (stereotypes). Denigration mainly takes the
form of verbal hostility against different cultures, but there are also many cases in
which people masquerade their aggressiveness as defence, by underlining the
‘dangers’ posed by an ethnic or religious group.
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Such cognitive defence strategies seem to arise from the fear of not being able to
maintain one’s self-schema, as well as from the need to counter the anxiety of
confronting one’s weaknesses and tackle anything opposing one’s worldview. With
this in mind, we will now focus on a few examples of comments that we have
collected from Italian media as a way of showcasing this defensive approach to hate
speech.
(1) Domani la nostra città sarà per l’ennesima volta un deprimente palcoscenico
di qualche migliaio di frustrati, vittime di aberrazioni della natura.1
Tomorrow our city will again become a depressing stage for a thousand or so
frustrated people, victims of nature’s perversion.
The homophobic comment above is found in an article reporting the unfolding of
the 2015 gay pride parade in Milan with the presence of the city mayor. It was made
by two city councillors, members of the Italian regionalist party Northern League
(famous for its xenophobic positions). Besides the intention to attack the opposing
party, this comment reveals their hostility towards the LGBT community as a
whole, which they characterise as ‘frustrated’ as well as comprising ‘victims of
nature’s perversion,’ hence highlighting their declassiﬁcation through denigration.
The use of the possessive adjective ‘our’ in ‘our city’ aims to stress the identiﬁ-
cation of a common good (the city) and emphasises their feeling of being threatened
and besieged by the LGBT community which is evidently not considered to belong
to the councillors’ in-group (Othering). Thus the defence mechanism manifests
itself with the neat opposition that the councilmen build between themselves (and
their audience) and the LGBT community with all its characteristics.
The following comment also belongs to the same article and constitutes another
interesting example of a homophobic statement:
(2) Che palle che ci fanno questi gay pride e i relativi componenti e pure i politici che
gli accodano per i voti, pisapia docet. Ovviamente ognuno di noi deve esprimere
la sua sessualità nel letto con chi più gradisce, contento lui/lei contenti tutti, ma
non vedo perché devono fare queste RIDICOLE BUFFONATE e
SONO ANCORA PIU’ BUFFONI COLORO CHE AUTORIZZANO A FARLE.2
What a load of bullshit these gay parades, their afﬁliates and also the politicians
who join them to get more votes, Pisapia is the ﬁrst of them. Anyone should
be able to obviously express their sexuality in bed with whom they want,
but I really don’t understand why they should be doing this RIDICULOUS
NONSENSE and THOSE GIVING THEM PERMISSION TO DO IT ARE
EVEN MORE RIDICULOUS.
1Comment located at: http://www.milanopost.info/2015/06/27/oggi-il-gay-pride-con-matrimonio-
collettivo-ﬁnale-lega-aberrazioni-della-natura/.
2Comment located at: http://www.milanopost.info/2015/06/27/oggi-il-gay-pride-con-matrimonio-
collettivo-ﬁnale-lega-aberrazioni-della-natura/.
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Here, the reader commenting on the article categorises the LGBT community as
engaging in nonsensical activities. In order to understand the defence mechanism at
play here, we need to focus on the event described in the article, the gay parade, which
the reader seems to be hostile to (despite him/her stating that everyone is free to
privately express their sexuality). This hostility manifests itself not only in relation to
LGBT community members but also to anyone supporting them (e.g. the mayor and
city council). This extension towards anyone related to this social group represents a
mechanism of generalisation juxtaposing ‘I, myself’ from ‘them’, thus highlighting
the fear of an attack to one’s own identity. On the one hand, the commenter seems to
be in favour of sexual freedom as a commonsense principle for all individuals, but
then on the other, ironically labels gay parades as ‘ridiculous nonsense’.
We would like now to go through an example of a xenophobic comment taken
from the Italian weekly news magazine L’espresso, addressed against the Roma
community, which is often discriminated against in Italy:
(3) Quando vedrò un ROM onesto nevicherà il 15 di Agosto! E’ l’ora di farsi
sentire, di far capire a questa feccia che prima vengono i diritti degli onesti
cittadini e poi i loro. Non se ne può più di vivere col terrore che ti vengano a
svaligiare casa, causandoti molti danni per pochi euro di refurtiva. Basta!!!
Che se ne tornino nei Balcani, devono capire che l’Italia deve essere un paese
deromizzato.3
When I see an honest Roma person it will be snowing on the 15th August! It’s
time to raise the voice. The time has come to make this scum understand that
the rights of honest citizens come ﬁrst and then theirs follow. Enough with
living with the fear of burglars who cause lots of damage for just a few euros of
loot. Enough!!! Let them go back to the Balkans, they need to understand that
Italy has to be deromanised!
More so than the previous examples, this comment shows how the phenomenon of
stereotype-forming is deeply rooted in society. With a strong emphasis on the use of
(cynical) sarcasm, the reader underlines how being honest and being a Roma person
is contradictory and essentially ‘as odd as snow in mid-August’. The reader’s
cognitive process follows the line of advocating a common ﬁght against a foe
(‘them’) with a clear defence strategy of ‘us honest people’ against ‘them, dishonest
Roma’ (as in the eternal ﬁght between good and evil). The xenophobic climax is
reached with the use of the term ‘scum’ to deﬁne the entire Roma group. This is a
case where a stereotype is taken to an extreme, becoming prejudice, and where
categorisation becomes a hate instrument. Roma people are pointed at as thieves or
brigands from whom Italians have to defend themselves. In this sense, a strong
nationalism underlies this particular example of categorisation, which is deeply
rooted in the reader’s belief that the country needs to be ‘deromanised’. All in all,
what is perceived as a huge social problem is given an extreme solution: as in the
3Comment located at: http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2015/06/05/news/la-festa-degli-
zingari-nell-anno-della-destra-con-salvini-e-le-pen-sempre-peggio-1.215215?refresh_ce.
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worst examples of racism, the user pictures society as a place where people should
be divided on the basis of their ethnicity.
As the examples discussed above show, hateful discourse, prejudice-based
remarks or even incitement to violence against certain individuals/social groups
often arise because their identity and social roles have been respectively reduced to
their ethnicity and anti-social actions, so much so that they are perceived as a threat
to one’s (or to the whole nation’s) identity. In this respect, defence mechanisms,
which emerge from the generalisation of particular characteristics allocated to
determined social groups, aim at responding to the unpleasant emotions triggered
by some perceived stereotype and at preventing the anxiety generated by the fear of
a possible identity crisis and an attack on one’s own life context.
3.2 Stereotyping Vulnerable Groups
Uladzislau Ivanou
Negative stereotypes and their influence on social inequality may often be under-
estimated, but the connection between stereotypes and the explosion of hate speech
is nowadays becoming increasingly obvious. In our study of hate speech in
Lithuanian newspaper comments, stereotypes were found mainly in comments
made in response to articles encompassing either a neutral or a positive attitude
towards the populations usually affected by xenophobia and homophobia; however,
due to space restrictions, this section will focus solely on homophobia and its
expression through the use of stereotypes. That said, and before moving on, it is
important to note that, in the Lithuanian context, stereotyping of the LGBTIQ
community affects male individuals engaging in homosexuality more than it does
female ones.4 That is why the absolute majority of stereotypes concerning the
LGBTIQ population in the present comments analysis applies to gay men and
includes stereotypes identiﬁed through the use of keywords such as ‘gay pride’,
‘LGBT’, ‘homosexuality’, ‘homosexuals’, ‘gays’ and ‘sexual minorities’.
Stereotyping is not just a phenomenon but also a process, since stereotypes
evolve and are constantly enriched. For example, as we will see, in the Lithuanian
context, gay men are not only viewed as ‘chicken hawks’, but can also be stereo-
typically perceived as ‘zoophiles’, ‘fetishists’ or even ‘democratic scum’. This
stereotyping process poses what has been labelled a “stereotype threat” (Inzlicht
and Schmader 2011), where hate speech transforms into action and can lead to hate
crime. History has numerous examples of initially harmless stereotypes gradually
4As Wittig has noted (2007), and in accordance with various studies concerning the issue in the EU
(cf. SOS Homophobie 2008; Gabrieliūtė 2012; Desombre et al. 2017), lesbians often remain
invisible, due to their double marginalisation as women in the masculine society and as repre-
sentatives of a sexuality which is relatively “safe” and “alternative”, and not in direct conflict with
heterosexuality.
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transformed into isolated and later collective displays of hate speech and, ﬁnally,
actions and crimes, involving mass extermination and harassment of vulnerable
groups: witches, Roma, Jews, Armenians, homosexuals etc.
To understand stereotyping as a phenomenon and process, the context in which a
stereotype is used is important. For instance, the stereotype of a ‘feminist’ will differ
among conservatives, Christians and leftists, as would the stereotype of a ‘redneck’
among feminists and blue collars. A stereotype’s (positive or negative) connotations
should also be taken into consideration. For example, according to van Ypersele
and Klein (2006), gay stereotyping in Lithuania, which has always been negative in
nature, is characteristic of hasty and extremely reductionist collective evaluations
that are reproduced across generations. As Cuddy et al. (2009) put it, homosexuality
belongs to the category of contemptuous stereotypes.
According to the Stereotype Content Model (henceforth SCM) (Fiske et al.
2002), any stereotype includes two levels of content: a descriptive one, which
encompasses those qualities of a certain group that trigger emotions (and are
therefore mocked in our setting), and an explanatory content, which deals with the
underlying idea that motivates the expression of a stereotype in a certain context.
Considering their descriptive and explanatory components, the stereotypes con-
cerning homosexuality that were identiﬁed on the basis of the online comments
collected as part of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project in the Lithuanian context are pro-
vided in Table 3.1.
Stereotypes are produced under the influence of a certain socio-political culture
and are affected by signiﬁcant external influences. Thus, in Lithuania, the influence
of the Russian culture during the Russian-empire as well as the Soviet era should be
Table 3.1 Stereotypes related to homosexuality in the Lithuanian C.O.N.T.A.C.T. corpus
Descriptive content Explanatory content
Homosexuals are a plague (found in 238
comments)
Almost everybody in Europe is gay, and they
would turn everyone else gay too.
Homosexuals are sick (found in 259
comments)
Homosexuality is as sick as paedophilia,
scatophilia or zoophilia.
Homosexuals are exhibitionists (found in
109 comments)
Gay men take their clothes off during gay
parades, ‘Gayvision’ (Eurovision) and other
events.
Homosexuals are liberal, tolerant, and
democratic scum (found in 338
comments)
A new dangerous gay-tolerant ideology of
genderism (like a new Bolshevism) is developing
in Europe.
Gay men are effeminate (found in 533
comments)
Many gay men like to dress like women and
select feminine trades (e.g. make-up artists).
Homosexuals show contempt to God
(found in 8 comments)
As people in Europe turn their back on God, the
course of nature is disrupted, and more and more
people become gay.
Homosexuals are selﬁsh (found in 17
comments)
Homosexual people do not conform to the values
of the family, nation, country, and only live for
themselves.
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taken into consideration. When it comes to stereotypes of gay men, it is possible to
ﬁnd both the Soviet trace or mediation of the Soviet and later Russian culture in the
expressions ‘liberal gays’, ‘democratic trash’, and the local, national trace, when
there is talk about homosexuality as a threat to national prosperity.
A socio-linguistic analysis of image stereotypes underscores a mixed nature of
stereotyping where an interplay of global and local influences is evident, with
stereotypical images of gay men in Lithuanian including ‘piderastas’ (faggot),
‘pedikas’ (fag), ‘homikas’ (woofer), and ‘žydras’ (banana crammer), all of which
are borrowed from Russian (cf. Jasiūnaitė 2005, 2006, 2009; Zaikauskas 2007:
114–115).
In terms of prevalence, stereotypes concerning gay men can be classiﬁed as
typical, that is, universal and known in the neighbouring countries and in Europe as
a whole (e.g. ‘Homosexuality is a disease’, ‘Gay men are effeminate’) and rare
(‘Gay people are selﬁsh’). Still, some universal stereotypes acquire additional local
shades of meaning: thus, for example, the stereotype of homosexual ‘promiscuity’,
and ‘decay of virtue’ gets extended in the Lithuanian setting to encompass an
extreme form of liberalism, as is seen in the description of gay individuals as
‘democratic scum’ (“demokratijos šlamštas”), since decay of virtue is often asso-
ciated in the region (Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania) with excessive democratism. In this
setting, due to the freedom of gay people in the West, the value of democracy is
discredited under the influence of the traditional, and sometimes quite authoritarian,
political stance that was inherited from the USSR and is still upheld in domestic
nationalism beliefs. This is also evident in the widespread, in our data, stereotype of
‘тaлepacты’ (people tolerating gays) in Europe, who are deemed to be too lenient
with homosexuality.
Turning to what can be described as a rare stereotype of homosexuality
stereotype present in the local media, we ﬁnd the belief that homosexual individuals
are selﬁsh
(4) O LGBT visuomenė, kurios tikslai egoistiniai ir visą visuomenę vedantys į
niekur, meilės nenusipenė ir niekada nesusipelnys.5
LGBT people are selﬁsh, they don’t deserve to be protected by the state.
Yet, the belief that gay people ‘think and love themselves only’ and ‘are not ready
to be responsible’ and create a family is quite paradoxical, since homosexual
individuals have no right to assume such a responsibility in Lithuania, where
neither same sex union nor adoption are allowed by the state.
All in all, the investigation of stereotypes related to homophobia (and xeno-
phobia, by association) is not just a research curiosity, but rather an inquiry into the
weaknesses of our society, and its ﬁndings can inform both politicians and the
public about some issues that should be addressed not only by politicians, but by
education and media specialists too. As Barthes, who deﬁned the stereotype as
5Comment located at: http://www.tv3.lt/naujiena/834689/lgl-vadovas-lesbietes-ir-gejai-islieka-
tarp-labiausiai-pazeidziamu-visuomenes-grupiu.
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something solid, unshakable, unchanging and—at the same time—monstrous,
notes, it is possible to presume that politics has no unshakable and unchanging
territory (1975: 63). That is why policy-making in relation to the detection and
prevention of hate speech and crimes should also have the objective of minimising
negative stereotypes on top of preventing incitement to violence.
3.3 From ‘Patriotism’ to Hate: Axiological Urgency
in Online Comments Related to Refugees
Monika Kopytowska, Julita Woźniak and Łukasz Grabowski
In his Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger, Appadurai
points to “a lack of tolerance of any sort of collective stranger” tied to uncertainty
resulting from blurring “the boundaries of national peoplehood” (2006: 45). The
collective Self, contingent on membership in social groups and the shared identi-
ﬁcation with these groups, along with the in-group versus out-group construction,
gains particular prominence in times of conflict and crisis of political, ethnic,
cultural, religious, or economic nature. Deﬁning the Other allows for the (re)deﬁ-
nition of the Self and “functions to promote straightforward feelings of identiﬁ-
cation, empathy or disapproval” (Fowler 1991: 15). The dynamics of this process is
captured by van Dijk’s “ideological square” (1998: 33), set to present ‘us’ in a
favourable light and ‘them’ unfavourably, and consisting in emphasising ‘our’ good
properties/actions, while highlighting ‘their’ bad properties/actions. In this sense, it
is related to what Chilton calls delegitimisation, which involves
acts of negative other presentation, acts of blaming, scape-goating, marginalising, excluding,
attacking the moral character of some individual or group, attacking the communicative
cooperation of the other, attacking the rationality and sanity of the other (2004: 47).
Within the Media Proximisation Approach (Kopytowska 2015a, b), this process
of polarisation is discussed in terms of cognitive-discursive operations within the
domain of axiology characterised by three functions:
1. establishing axiological status: that is, ‘our’ values/norms;
2. delineating axiological conflict: that is, the incompatibility of ‘our’ values/norms
with ‘their’ values/norms; and,
3. conveying axiological urgency: that is, responding to a threat posed (often by
‘their’ actions) to ‘our’ values/norms and accepting moral responsibility to act.
This axiological conflict is, for example, reflected by the most frequent
migrant-related topoi/themes in the UK press, as listed by Hart (cf. Table 3.2),
which, connected with the concept of physical or mental threat, are likely to gen-
erate fear and evoke strongly negative emotional responses towards migrants (Hart
2010, see also Richardson and Colombo 2013).
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Another way to promote anxiety and panic is the use of metaphors conceptu-
alising immigration as an invasion and as flooding the country (cf. Mahtani and
Mountz 2002). Perceived in this way, migrants and refugees inevitably constitute a
threat to the collective Self and the survival of a community as a cohesive unit (cf.
Buzan et al. 1998): in the particular setting of the current migration crisis, coming
from a predominantly Muslim background, they are likely to bring in beliefs and
traditions incompatible with the European Christian worldview.
This stance gains even more relevance in the case of ethnically and religiously
homogenous societies, such as the Polish one. Here, the sense of threat and axio-
logical urgency is not only justiﬁed quantitatively (religious/ethnic majority), but
also substantiated with historical experience and collective memory. More pre-
cisely, over the centuries, the sovereignty of Poland and its people’s status quo have
been threatened by various Others during the time of partitions, World War I and II,
and the Soviet Union’s domination. The cult of struggle for national integrity and
militant opposition against the enemy have become a hallmark of Polish patriotism,
with its slogan ‘Bóg, Honor, Ojczyzna’ (‘God, Honour, Fatherland’).
Against this background, we will explore, in this section, the discursive
dynamics of Polish online ‘patriotism’ and its interface with fear-mongering and
incitement to hatred against the Other(s). More speciﬁcally, we will demonstrate
how, by appealing to collective memory, existing stereotypes and cultural/national
values, media texts producers and commenters create a sense of axiological urgency
and arouse strong negative emotions, thus possibly bonding the in-group and
legitimising verbal and physical aggression directed at the out-group perceived as
the threat and the enemy.
Refugee-related hate speech with “patriotic” undertones has been chosen for
several reasons. Firstly, Poland is one of the EU countries ‘experiencing’ the crisis
and ‘moral panic’ without being directly affected by the physical presence of
migrants and refugees. Constituting a pillar of the dominant narrative of the
Table 3.2 Migrant-related topoi in the UK press (after Hart 2010: 67)
Axiological
value
Description
Burden The out-group needs to be supported by the in-group
Character The out-group has certain undesirable characteristics
Crime The out-group consists of criminals
Culture The out-group has different norms and values than the in-group and is unable
to assimilate
Danger The out-group is dangerous
Disadvantage The out-group brings no advantages/is of no use to the in-group
Disease The out-group is dirty and carries infectious diseases
Displacement The out-group will eventually outnumber and/or dominate the in-group and
will get privileged access to limited socio-economic resources, over and
above the in-group
Exploitation The out-group exploits the welfare system of the in-group
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country’s ruling conservative government and of right-wing media, this
anti-migrant rhetoric has played an important role in the (mediated) construction of
the crisis in Poland (cf. Kopytowska et al. 2017; Kopytowska and Grabowski
2017). Secondly, the analysed data powerfully reflect a peculiar form of the Polish
‘patriotism’ thriving on national pride, collective memory, belligerent courage, and
the need to unite against an external enemy. Thirdly, such instances of anti-migrant
discourse provide evidence of how ethnic and religious homogeneity can be
effectively exploited in collective identity formation and Us versus Them con-
struction in times of (perceived) crisis.
To examine how Polish “patriotism” is conceptualised and used as motivation
for and justiﬁcation of hate speech directed against refugees and migrants, three
salient concepts associated with the national collective identity, namely ‘Polska’
(‘Poland’), ‘Polak’ (‘Pole’), and ‘nasz’ (‘our’), were identiﬁed and analysed in the
Polish C.O.N.T.A.C.T. corpus. More speciﬁcally, after identifying comments for
the keyword ‘uchodźcy’ (‘refugees’) following the common C.O.N.T.A.C.T.
methodology,6 we tagged and parsed them using Sketch Grammar for Polish, which
was developed on the basis of the tagset of the IPI PAN Corpus of Polish and
implemented into the SketchEngine software (Kilgarriff et al. 2014).
In our corpus, ‘nasz’ (‘our’) collocates with the following nouns: ‘kraj’
(‘country’), ‘ojczyzna’ (‘fatherland’), ‘dom’ (‘home’), ‘zasada’ (‘rule’), ‘rodak’
(‘compatriot’), ‘kultura’ (‘culture’), ‘demokracja’ (‘democracy’), ‘historia’ (‘his-
tory’), ‘terytorium’ (‘territory’), ‘ulica’ (‘street’), ‘kobieta’ (‘woman’), while iso-
lating comments made in response to YouTube videos alone, it correspondingly
collocates with: ‘kraj’ (‘country’), ‘teren’ (‘territory’), ‘cywilizacja’ (‘civilisation’),
‘ojczyzna’ (‘homeland’), ‘rodzina’ (‘family’), ‘przodek’ (‘ancestor’), ‘granica’
(‘border’), ‘dziecko’ (‘child’). Subsequent word sketches and concordance analyses
revealed several interesting patterns in the semantic prosody of these words and
their “axiological potential”. For example, ‘Poland’ frequently appears in the phrase
‘Polska dla Polaków’ (‘Poland for Poles’), but also in such statements as that it is
not a place for ‘szumowin imigracyjnych’ (‘immigration scum’), and it will not
accept ‘tych bydlaków, pasożytów, gwałcicieli, terrorystów’ (‘these beasts, para-
sites, rapists, terrorists’). Spatial appropriation is also often visible:
(5) nasza Ojczyzna należy do Nas Polaków7
our Homeland belongs to Us Poles
(6) Nie pozwólmy żeby to ścierwo wkradało się na nasze tereny8
Let’s not allow this carcass to sneak into our territory
6One particularity of the Polish C.O.N.T.A.C.T. corpus is that on top of the comments posted in
news portals, it also comprises comments made in response to YouTube videos whose description
included the keywords under scrutiny. The corpus of comments presented in this paper was
compiled in December 2016–February 2017.
7Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/87995-tyle-kopacz-krzyczala-uchodzcy-w-polsce-
opozycja-wreszcie-przyznala-racje-pis.
8Comment located at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23XtoujJbjM.
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(7) PiS nie wpuści brudasów do naszego kraju9
Law and Justice will not let allow these slobs to enter our country
(8) nie ulegac Niemcom z ich bandyckim planem podrzucenia najezdzcow-dziczy
do naszej Ojczyzny!10
let’s not give into Germans with their thuggish plan to bring invaders-savages
into our Homeland!
Refugees and migrants are not only axiologically downgraded by being dehu-
manised through animal metaphors, but are also presented as a threat of both moral
and physical nature:
(9) Nie szanują absolutnie niczego w naszej cywilizacji11
They have no respect for anything in our civilisation
(10) będą nasze dzieci, nasze wnuki zabijać za allaha12
they will kill our children, our grandchildren for Allah
(11) będą nas rabować, bić gwałcić nasze kobiety13
they will rob us, beat up and rape our women
Finally, particular instances of the Other’s savagery are provided, as in the
following comment:
(12) pierwsze ataki islamistow w Niemczech na Polakow:
– zamordowanie meczeta Polki,
– zamordowanie Polaka kierowcy TIRa,
– podpalenie Polaka bezdomnego,
to sa poczatki, musimy byc przygotowani Polacy rodacy ze takie ataki beda
coraz czestsze, nalezy zachowac czujnosc w Niemczech, Polsce i innych
krajach UE, poniewaz Polacy stawiamy tame nachodzcom ta fala bedzie
napierala na Polske i Polakow mocno,jak potop szwedzki i radziecki.14
ﬁrst attacks of islamists in Germany affecting Poles:
– killing a Polish woman with a machete
– killing a Polish lorry driver
– setting ﬁre to a homeless Pole
This is just the beginning, Polish fellows we have to be prepared for the fact
that such attacks will be more and more frequent, we need to be on alert in
9Comment located at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SQkT7vOV4k.
10Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75987-uchodzcy-coraz-bardziej-agresywni-niemcy-
chca-zeby-do-nich-strzelac-wideo.
11Comment located at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SQkT7vOV4k.
12Comment located at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsb63e2WznI.
13Comment located at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsb63e2WznI.
14Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/91340-uchodzcy-podpalili-polaka-sa-aresztowani.
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Germany, Poland and other EU countries because we Poles prevent the
invaders this wave will hit Poland as hard as the Swedish or Soviet Deluge.
In view of such a threat, counteraction seems to be a moral obligation and
patriotic duty. Commenters thus pledge to protect the Polish people:
(13) MY będziemy BRONIĆ naszych kobiet i dzieci przed zagrożeniem.15
WE will DEFEND our women and children against this threat.
(14) Będziemy po swojemu z nimi załatwiać, Polacy znowu wezmą w swoje ręce
rozprawę z islamem!16
We will deal with them in our own way; the Poles will again crack down on
Islam!
At the same time, using both imperative forms and modals with deontic meaning
as collocates of ‘we’ and ‘Poles’, they call on their compatriots to be vigilant and
take action:
(15) musimy się wszyscy przygotować na odpór tej zarazy.17
we have to prepare to ﬁght off this plague.
(16) musimy się połączyć wziąć się w garść i im pokazać co potraﬁą Polacy zanim
będzie za późno.18
we have to unite, pull ourselves together to show them what Poles are able to
do before it is too late.
Religion also emerges as a salient issue, and Islam is presented as incompatible
with the Polish culture:
(17) Polacy mowia NIE islamizacji Polski i basta!19
Poles say NO to the islamisation of Poland and that’s enough!
(18) Polacy nie zgadzają się na islam w Polsce!20
Poles do not agree to Islam in Poland!’
Interestingly, references are also made to Jan III Sobieski, a Polish king credited
with turning back the last great wave of Muslim expansion in Europe through his
victory against the Turks in the battle of Vienna in 1683. In some comments, his
actions are given as an example of patriotic spirit and something to be cherished and
15Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/91340-uchodzcy-podpalili-polaka-sa-aresztowani.
16Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/74915-w-niemczech-nowe-ataki-imigrantow-na-dzieci-
i-kobiety-czy-merkel-przetrwa.
17Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75363-juz-wiadomo-gdzie-beda-przebywac-w-polsce-
uchodzcy.
18Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75401-skandaliczne-zachowania-uchodzcow-na-
niemieckich-basenach.
19Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/78070-zamachowcy-z-brukseli-uchodzcy-ilu-jeszcze-
terrorystow-wpuszczono-do-europy.
20Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75363-juz-wiadomo-gdzie-beda-przebywac-w-polsce-
uchodzcy.
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continued. From this perspective, letting in refugees, who are Muslims, will be a
crime and lack of respect for national history and values:
(19) i usilnie namawiam rodaków do bezwzgledności! Po co Jan III Sobieski ich
pogonił, tak sobie a my mamy to w d…e?21
and I strongly urge my compatriots to be ruthless! Why John III Sobieski
chased them away, for nothing and we don’t give a f…k?
As far as cultural and moral values are concerned, the Polish nation emerges as both
self-sufﬁcient and superior:
(20) My Polacy NIC nikomu nie jesteśmy winni i nie potrzebujemyich “ubogaca-
nia” bo nie potrzebna nam jest ta ich “kultura”na poziomoe VII czy VIII
wieku podniesiona do rangi “bogactwa kulturowego” za pomocą noży,
kałachów i ładunków wybuchowych.22
We Poles do not owe ANYTHING to anybody and we do not need their
“enrichment” because we do not need their “culture” from the level of 7th or
8th c. elevated to the level of “cultural richness” with the help of knives,
Kalashnikovs, explosives.
(21) Naród Polski nie wyraża zgody na mieszanie wrogich obcych kultur i religii ze
zdobyczami wartości narodowych w Polskiej przestrzeni terytorialnej.23
The Polish people does not agree to mixing other hostile cultures and religions
with the heritage of national values on the Polish territory.
Also, its virtue seems to lie in its readiness to take up arms if the need arises:
(22) Jesteśmy jednym z najbardziej walecznych nacji w Europie. Sam wezmę udział
w obronie moich rodaków, jeśli trzeba będzie.24
We are one of the most gallant nations in Europe. I myself will take part in
defending my compatriots if necessary.
(23) Jesteśmy Polakami i Patriotami i chcemy dobrze dla Kraju naszych przodków
którzy też o to samo niejednokrotnie walczyli z bronią w ręku.25
We are Poles and Patriots and we want all the best for the Land of our fathers
who often took to arms to ﬁght for this.
21Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75363-juz-wiadomo-gdzie-beda-przebywac-w-polsce-
uchodzcy.
22Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/74915-w-niemczech-nowe-ataki-imigrantow-na-dzieci-
i-kobiety-czy-merkel-przetrwa.
23Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75363-juz-wiadomo-gdzie-beda-przebywac-w-polsce-
uchodzcy.
24Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/75363-juz-wiadomo-gdzie-beda-przebywac-w-polsce-
uchodzcy.
25Comment located at: http://niezalezna.pl/74661-uchodzcy-w-polsce-najpierw-kobiety-dzieci-i-
chrzescijanie.
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As revealed by word-occurrence patterns in the analysed corpus, frequent appeals to
the national pride, identity and history on the one hand, and to the need to protect
Poles from both physical and moral threat, on the other, seem to represent a way of
motivating people to act against refugees and migrants. As the threat is presented as
imminent, there appears to be an axiological urgency to act, manifested in excla-
mations and imperatives expressing commands. To evoke fear of and anger at the
refugees, their potentially harmful actions are given both in the form of factual
occurrences (past and present tense, perfective and progressive aspect) and immi-
nent acts of violence (future tense). At the same time, references are made to heroic
deeds and sacriﬁce in the Polish history, to national heroes and to events which are
salient in the Polish collective memory.
All in all, an opposition is constructed between a Christian, European, civilised
world, with Poland at the forefront, and the world of the primitive Other.26 Having
no intelligence and morality, this Other has no respect for ‘our’ values and since
reasoning with ‘them’ is out of the question, the only way to protect ‘our’ values is
to use force. Hence we ﬁnd in our corpus frequent calls to actions (involving
physical violence) which should be (or are intended to be) taken. Importantly, since
cyberspace, with its interactive and intertextual potential, allows groups and indi-
viduals with similar (often radical) ideas to connect, this hostile form of Polish
‘patriotism’ becomes salient in online discourse, thus generating a spiral of hate (cf.
Kopytowska et al. 2017) in subsequent comments and conveying a sense of axi-
ological urgency: We have to act before the Other(s) invade and destroy us.
3.4 Metaphors Related to Othering the Non-natives
Fabienne H. Baider, Anna Constantinou and Anastasia Petrou
Recurrent linguistic strategies and speciﬁc discursive choices are often employed
with a view to constructing the exclusion of the out-group and the cohesion of the
in-group (Baker et al. 2008). Such discursive choices include referential strategies,
like epistemic modalities attributing negative qualities to the out-group, exploitation
of existing stereotypes, aggregation (i.e. referring to a homogeneous group that also
shares the same intentions), as well as intensiﬁcation (i.e. the excessive use of
quantifying adverbs or adjectives). Such ﬁgures of speech reinforce conscious or
subliminal fears related to the LGBTIQ community or to immigrants and encourage
socio-cultural practices as well as interpersonal relations on the basis of negative
tropes.
Metaphors are particularly important to study since “understanding the sys-
tematic nature of metaphor choices” allows us to understand in turn how “entire
26Interestingly, there is a parallel in this regard between our ﬁndings and other analyses of
extreme-right discourse (cf. Baider and Constantinou 2017).
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belief systems are conceived and communicated” (Charteris-Black 2005: 3, our
italics). In particular, metaphors of THREAT, LEECHES or PARASITES are typically used
to ostracise the non-natives (Musolff 2015; Baker et al. 2008), and have also been
described as being coherent with the beliefs, actions, or imaginings of the person
using them. In a way, metaphors can reveal the underlying conceptual frame of
their producer and give access to a set of assumptions made by competent members
of a discourse community about the ‘typical’ aspects of a member of a minority or
any person belonging (or appearing as belonging) to that group. This then leads to
the conceptualisation of metaphors as creating or conﬁrming stereotypes (Zinken
2003).
In light of the above, the aim of the present section is to understand how in the
context of the small Orthodox island of Cyprus, where almost no refugees had
landed during the summer of 2015 and where religion plays an active part in
politics and everyday life (cf. Baider 2017), xenophobic metaphors are used to
construct the social Other in social media. Due to space limitations, this section
focuses only on our analysis of comments retrieved on the basis of the keywords
‘refugee(s)’, ‘migrant(s)’ and ‘foreigner(s)’ in line with the common C.O.N.T.A.C.
T. methodology.27
For these particular keywords, we collected 2446 comments. Our analysis of
these comments in terms of polarity revealed that more comments were negative
than positive but not overwhelmingly so, as Table 3.3 shows.
Having collected and classiﬁed our data in this way, we then proceeded to
identify the most common linguistic means that are used to negatively categorise
the social groups at hand. Here, the most frequent means include metaphors, insults,
proverbs and irony/sarcasm, but for the purposes of this section we will focus on
metaphors as a means for Othering migrants, foreigners and refugees. Most work
dealing with the use of metaphors in discourse related to migration (see, for
instance, Santa Ana 1999) has shown that it is often being conceptualised as a
Table 3.3 Polarity analysis of the Cypriot C.O.N.T.A.C.T. corpus
Polarity Raw number of comments Percentage in overall corpus (%)
Positive 543 22.2
Negative 945 38.6
Irrelevant/neutrala 958 39.2
aThis category comprises comments not directly referring to the keyword, diverting from the
article’s subject and/or the keyword group, as well as empty comments, where just a Facebook
friend is tagged. It is important for the Cypriot data to include the neutral category given the
polysemy of the word refugees that is also commonly used to refer to the Greek Cypriots that were
displaced as a result of the 1974 occupation or to the newcomers to the island
27As already mentioned in the previous chapter, since our keyword search in the online editions of
Cypriot newspapers did not generate a high number of articles and comments, we turned to the
newspapers’ Facebook pages, which users check more often and are thus more inclined to com-
ment on articles posted on them.
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natural or manmade disaster (typically referred to using lexemes related to floods,
tsunamis or pollution) and migrants, refugees and foreigners as menacing animals,
bacteria and beasts of burden.
Table 3.4 summarises those conceptual metaphors that we encountered in our
collected comments the most, alongside some examples of phrases that seem to
trigger the relevant classiﬁcation within them.
Even though Table 3.4 shows the most typical anti–immigration discourse
tropes, it is not the same metaphors that are found for each category of Other in our
dataset. For example, the category ‘refugee(s)’, which is the most diversely con-
structed one, comprises mainly metaphors characterising the relevant individuals as
disgusting animals (‘worms’ in 24) or pests (‘mice’ in 25):
(24) sόro hqάro1 sa rjotkίjia, avάqirsa adέrposa paqotriάfomsai le
apaisήrei1.28
They have audacity these worms; these ungrateful stray animals come over
with demands.
(25) Osam lia vxqa re uikonemη re saifei jri eirai aruakei1 apo som pokelo
pot tpaqvei rsηm vxqa rot jai ert amsi ma leimη1 rsηm pasqida rot ma
pokelηrei1 uetcei1 ram pomsijo1 dialaqsiqerai avaqirse?29
When a country is hosting, feeding and protecting you from the war that is
going on in your country, and you leave from your homeland like a mouse,
instead of staying and ﬁghting, how can you be complaining, you ungrateful?
Conversely, the category ‘migrant(s)’ seems to be more commonly attributed
metaphors of OUTLAW, VIOLENCE and DISEASE:
Table 3.4 Recurrent metaphors used for Othering immigrants in the Cypriot C.O.N.T.A.C.T.
corpus
Metaphor of Example
DISEASE Refugees have not done ‘medical tests.’
DIRT Zero policy migration is ‘a global clean up.’
AMORALITY Female foreigners being referred to as ‘prostitutes.’
SUBHUMAN/
ALIEN
Immigrants being referred to using animal categories, such as ‘mice’, ‘worms’
and ‘monkeys.’
OUTLAW ‘Migrants do everything illegally.’
BURDEN ‘Migrants expect to be taken care of.’
DANGER/
THREAT
Migrants have ‘dangerous relationships’ with Islam, ‘foreigners spread the
terror.’
28Comment located at: http://www.sigmalive.com/news/local/291098/epeisodiame-prosfyges-sto-
kentroypodoxis-sti-koﬁnou.
29Comment located at: http://www.facebook.com/phileleftheros/posts/956739704363984.
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(26) otan eﬁgan oi pappoudes mou epian me to plio kanonika kai me ton nomo stin
agklia! eperasan apo iatrikes epitropes kai 1000 dio alla, toutoi kamnoun
etsi? i adinatis na katalavis tin diafora metanasti me ton lathreo30
When my grandparents left, they went with the ship normally and legally to
England! They went through medical tests and a thousand other things; are
these ones [the migrants] doing the same? Or are you unable to understand the
difference between a legal and an illegal migrant?
As for the category ‘foreigner(s)’, it is more typically approached using the
metaphor of AMORALITY, which includes prostitution or sexual promiscuity and lack
of decent/moral behaviour as the following examples of comments in response to an
article entitled ‘A foreign woman abandoned her 12 year old child to go on a trip’
show:
(27) Ayti einai nootropia poutanou. epiase o poutanos ton moulla tziae epie stin
xwra tou. Alla en epire ton mikro mazi tis (…). etsi o poutanos eprotimise ton
moulla para to mwro tis31
This is the mindset of a whore. The whore got the mullah and went to her
country, but she didn’t take the boy with her (…). So the whore chose the
mullah instead of her baby.
(28) Prepei na bolla anomali, mana-teras, psyxoanomali… Thee mu…na analavei
to moro to kratos tse sta tsakkidia e opia k an einai e akatanomasti.32
She must be such a pervert, a monster of a mother, a schizo… Oh my God!
The baby needs to be taken care of by the state and she should go to hell
whoever she is…
Metaphors are an intrinsic part of the Othering process, and central to identity
construction. As such, they could easily lead to social exclusion and marginalisation
processes as well. Indeed, in example (25) above, the fact that refugees left their
country is interpreted as a lack of courage and therefore the metaphor of the mouse
is used. What is more, this animal metaphor could reveal a conceptualisation on the
part of the speaker which may in turn lead to an acceptance of treatment reserved
for pests against the target of this trope. In this vein, metaphors could act as a
transition from the argument ‘migrants should be deported’ to the conclusion ‘any
means are justiﬁed to do so,’ as they are, at the same time, the results of unspoken
premises and inferred conclusions.
All in all, this study conﬁrms that previously identiﬁed metaphors used to
Othering migrants and refugees in other languages are also found in Cypriot dis-
course. However, some tropes are typical of speciﬁc social categories, such as
AMORALITY being used only in relation to female foreigners in our data. From our
brief exploration of the topic, it seems safe to conclude that metaphors function as a
30Comment located at: http://www.sigmalive.com/news/international/225298/sima-kindynou-apo-
ploio-me-300-metanastes-sti-mesogeio.
31Comment located at: http://www.facebook.com/sigmalivecy/posts/10152932493703580.
32Comment located at: http://www.facebook.com/sigmalivecy/posts/10152932493703580.
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topos, i.e. as a place to look for arguments and a place where those arguments are
ready for use (Zagar 2010). Indeed, much like topoi, metaphors are part of a
categorisation scheme: they enable the speaker to construe an argument for a given
conclusion, which, in this case, is the equation of the Other to a negative ontological
(animal) or social (prostitute) category.
3.5 The Implicit Dimension of Discriminatory Discourse
Rebecca Vella Muskat and Stavros Assimakopoulos
From a purely legal viewpoint, one needs to prove intent to stir up violence and
hate toward a speciﬁc minority group in order to establish that some statement
constitutes hate speech. However, in order to accomplish a thorough understanding
of discrimination in language use as a social phenomenon, one would need to
broaden the deﬁnition of the term, so that it also includes strategies used to
implicitly impart a negative stance towards a given minority. As Reisigl and Wodak
characteristically note, while discussing prejudice in racist discourse,
a categorisation according to the sentence structure of the most obvious prejudices is only
partially able to grasp latent meanings, allusions, indirect strategies, vague formulations,
implications, and forms of argumentation, all of which can extend beyond a single sentence
and characterise written texts or oral discourse connected with prejudice and racism.
(Reisigl and Wodak 2005: 21).
In a similar vein, van Dijk also observes that “various types of implicitness play a
prominent role in texts about minorities,” and attributes this tendency to
“face-saving strategies [which] require that speakers avoid expressing explicitly
negative propositions about minorities” (1992: 225). Indeed, the Maltese strand of
the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project research showed that, perhaps in fear of appearing
intolerant towards migrants and/or the LGBTIQ community, most commenters who
expressed a negative stance towards these groups did so implicitly, using a number
of different indirect strategies.
Against this backdrop, this section will showcase how discrimination can be
implied below the surface structure of the actual language being used, using
examples from the online comments that were analysed following the common C.
O.N.T.A.C.T. methodology in the Maltese context. Naturally, the starting point
when one talks about implicit meaning is Grice, who famously coined the term
implicature to describe meaning that is communicated over and above what is
actually said by an utterance (Grice 1975). And even though we will not, in this
section, be dealing directly with the notion of implicature—or the Gricean analysis
of it for that matter, it should be acknowledged that it could, as a concept,
encompass most of the indirect strategies that can be used to express a negative
stance towards a minority. Perhaps the most pertinent aspect of implicature in this
regard can be found in the post-Gricean, relevance-theoretic reanalysis of
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implicatures as propositions that can, among other things, “be communicated with
varying degrees of strength, depending on the conﬁdence with which a hearer can
assume that they form part of the speaker’s informative intention” (Assimakopoulos
2017: 319). So, even though a statement may not constitute hate speech in the eyes
of the law, it might still reveal the discriminatory attitude of its producer, to the
extent that it could also be considered to be detrimental to the feeling of self-worth
of members of a minority group. What is crucial in this respect is, of course, to take
into account not only the explicit content of a given statement, but also the par-
ticular context in which it has been produced.
One of the most extensively researched categories of implicated meaning is that
of irony, which can be easily identiﬁed in the example that follows:
(29) We need to thank the geniuses who agreed with us signing the Dublin 2
convention. They want us to ﬁngerprint immigrants to make it easier for them
to identify and deport them back to Malta.33
At face value, the comment above has a particularly positive undertone, as it starts
off with positively charged words, like ‘thank’ and ‘geniuses’. Yet, when looked at
in its particular context, it is clear that it is meant as a negative comment against the
Maltese politicians who signed the ‘the Dublin 2 convention’,34 thus agreeing to
Malta being solely responsible for the examination of asylum applications by
refugees who enter the EU through its territory. The implicitly communicated
negative meaning of this comment is derived from the combinatorial meaning of the
two sentences it comprises, with the second sentence providing an explanation as to
why the ﬁrst one is intended as an ironical statement. In this second sentence, the
user creates a distinction between ‘us’ (=the Maltese) and (the ﬁrst, exophoric)
‘them’ (=other EU countries) to relay the information that ‘immigrants’35 are
unwanted and that the EU is using Malta as a dumping ground for this undesirable
group of people. It is therefore evident that the user employs irony to communicate
that the signing of the Dublin II convention was an unwise decision that has had
negative effects on Malta. And even though the implicature at hand strongly
communicates the user’s dismay at a particular political choice, it also carries a
weaker negative stance toward migrants, since the irony of the ﬁrst sentence in
33Comment located at: http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/60155/ec_rebukes_malta_
over_failure_to_fully_transpose_asylum_policies.
34The Dublin II Regulation, as it is also known, is a revised version of the Dublin Convention,
which originally came into force in 1997. The Dublin II Regulation was later signed in 2003 and
was applied to all EU member states, with the exception of Denmark. In short, it stipulates that it is
the member state that constitutes the point of entry of a refugee in the EU, and that state alone that
is responsible for processing the relevant refugee’s asylum application. This gives the right to
some other member state of the EU, where the refugee may have moved in the meantime, to deport
the refugee under question back to his/her original point of entry.
35Even the choice of the word ‘immigrant’ over other alternatives, such as ‘migrant,’ has been, on
its own, shown to carry negative connotations (Baker et al. 2008).
3.5 The Implicit Dimension of Discriminatory Discourse 43
combination with the elaboration provided in the second one makes it clear that the
user views migrants in Malta unfavourably.
The next example we will be discussing also belongs to the category of irony,
but has a more pronounced mocking tone, and can thus be more succinctly
described as an instance of sarcasm:
(30) While the local taxpayer will foot the bill for the police time, court time and
legal aid. Way to go!36
The news article with the headline ‘Libyan conditionally discharged after AWAS
row,’ to which this comment was a direct reply reported on a trial in which a man
from Libya, who pleaded guilty to the charges of causing material damages to the
Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers by breaking the glass surface of a desk
when he was not attended to, was conditionally discharged and ﬁned €80. Within
this context, the second sentence of the comment in (30), which, when used in a
neutral context, is a positive expression similar to ‘well done!’, is produced with a
sarcastic tone, showing the user’s negative stance toward the fact that a migrant has
cost the Maltese tax-payers money. This becomes clear by looking more closely at
the language used in the ﬁrst sentence of the comment. For one, the commenter uses
the expression ‘foot the bill’, which is typically used in situations when the person
paying a fee is somewhat unwillingly hoaxed into paying, in the same way a parent
might have to ‘foot the bill’ for damages caused by their children. Then, this
sentence also begins with the conjunction ‘while,’ which is often used to introduce
information that contrasts with the main clause (the ‘main clause’ in this case being
the narrative presented in the article, which merely reports the incident). Hence, the
ﬁrst sentence indicates a sort of forcible anchor on the taxpayer’s pocket, which is
obviously not viewed favourably by the commenter. Moreover, the user modiﬁes
the noun ‘taxpayer’ with the adjective ‘local’, thus further emphasising their dis-
may that a foreign person has cost the Maltese money. Again, much like in the
previous example in (29), even though the user strongly communicates their frus-
tration with a particular state policy by means of this comment, they also weakly
show a negative stance toward migrants and the presumed burden they put on the
Maltese economy.
Turning to the issue of indirectly discriminating against the LGBTIQ commu-
nity, the comment in (31) is a good example of a statement that may not constitute
prosecutable hate speech in itself, but is strongly discriminatory in nature:
(31) If adults have unwanted sexual urges or dreams, they should be able to get
help. Especially they are married and have kids. Whether those urges are for
men or young boys, it shouldn’t matter. Now if a parent sent his gay kid to
NARTH, that’s a different story.37
36Comment located at: http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160115/local/libyan-
conditionally-discharged-after-awas-row.598879.
37Comment located at: http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/54144/gay_conversion_
therapy_might_become_a_criminal_offence.
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To begin with, the commenter here does draw the line at parents forcibly sending
their children to NARTH (National Association for Research & Therapy of
Homosexuality), an organisation that offers gay conversion therapy, thus, recog-
nising the danger that such therapy can bring on LGBTIQ youth. However, the
language used in the rest of the comment indicates a strong negative stance toward
homosexuality and a profound ignorance of LGBTIQ issues. Firstly, the user refers
to non-straight sexual desires as ‘unwanted…urges’. Both these words have neg-
ative connotations and imply something unfavourable. Moreover, by way of the
modal verb ‘should’, the user offers a suggestion for people with such ‘urges’ to
‘get help’. In doing so, the user implies that heteronormative values are hegemonic
and any deviation from them creates an urgent need for the individual to seek
help. Finally, the use of the inclusive ‘or’ in the sentence ‘Whether those urges are
for men or young boys, it shouldn’t matter.’ strongly implicates that, in the mind of
the commenter, homosexuality is on a par with paedophilia and thus warrants
‘treatment.’ In view of all this, then, the ﬁnal, positive, statement that parents should
not force their children to undergo gay conversion therapy is overshadowed by the
overall negative stance the user has towards the LGBTIQ community.
Similarly, the comment in (32), which was made in response to a newspaper
article about the civil union of a gay couple, might not seem at ﬁrst to be overly
discriminatory. Yet, if we break it down into its component parts and discern the
meaning beneath the allusions being used therein, we might form a different opinion.
(32) people marry because they fall in love, and although it’s a choice, it was
meant to be like that even in the animal kingdom, for example swans mate for
life, male and female, not male and male.38
The user that posted this comment may posit the idea that marriage is a choice, but
frames the relevant clause with the conjunction ‘although’ (a conventional impli-
cature à la Grice), which is generally used to present two contrastive arguments,
thus indicating that even though marriage is a choice for people who fall in love, it
is also a choice that comes with restrictions. By bringing in a comparison with
mating in the animal kingdom, whereby all swan relationships are described as
being heterosexual, the commenter subscribes to heteronormative ideals, implying
in this way that any deviation from the heterosexual norm is unnatural. So, even
though this comment concedes that marriage is a choice, somewhat echoing the
main argument of most gay rights movements on the matter, it still exhibits a
negative attitude towards the members of the LGBTIQ community.
Clearly, this short section cannot do justice to the far-reaching implications that
that the study of indirectness can have for our understanding of discrimination in
language use. What we hope to have achieved through this discussion of some
online reactions to news items in the Maltese press is to have justiﬁed the need for
going beyond the explicitly expressed and overtly communicated meaning when it
38Comment located at: http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-04-26/local-news/Popular-
dancers-Felix-Busuttil-and-Daron-Galea-tie-the-knot-6736134473.
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comes to potentially discriminatory discourse. After all, as van Dijk rightly points
out, discourse of any kind “may be seen as a semantic iceberg, of which only a few
meanings are expressed on the surface of text and talk, whereas others meanings
remain implicit knowledge stored in mental models” (1993: 109) that he elsewhere
attributes to “(the users of) a text, [… and not to] the text itself” (2001: 104).39 And
given that the most effective weapon against xenophobia and homophobia
(alongside many other forms of discrimination) is the promotion of a more inclusive
mentality, the identiﬁcation of such beliefs that can tacitly sway the public opinion
towards discrimination is certainly pivotal.
3.6 Changing Participant Roles in the Expression of Hate
Speech
Sharon Millar, Klaus Geyer, Anna Vibeke Lindø and Rasmus Nielsen
Following Goffman (1981) and Levinson (1988), it has been generally acknowl-
edged that there are various production and reception roles in interaction that go
beyond the traditional, unnuanced categories of speaker and hearer. In Goffman’s
terms, these roles align or position the individual in relation to an utterance, which
he terms footing. Production roles may, for instance, be in the form of animator (the
person who produces the talk or the text), author (the person who creates what is
said or written), relayer (the person who relays the utterances of others) or principal
(the person whose position or beliefs are established by the utterance), while
reception roles include those of the addressee, bystander and eavesdropper. In this
setting, the role of ﬁgure refers to the entity being talked or written about. These
various interactional roles have been shown to be relevant to dialogically-oriented
discursive strategies, such as constructed dialogue (Tannen 2007) and ﬁctive
interaction (Pascual and Sandler 2016), which have afﬁnities with the Bakhtinian
notions of polyphony and heteroglossia. Constructed dialogue is Tannen’s preferred
term for reported speech since such speech is always recontextualised into new
discursive contexts, while ﬁctive interaction concerns “the use of the conversation
frame to structure cognition, discourse, and grammar” (Pascual and Sandler 2016:
3) and covers phenomena such as talking to oneself, engaging in dialogues with
virtual participants, or using rhetorical questions.
One could also argue that the technological affordances of online platforms
impact on participant roles. For instance, hyperlinks allow the writer of the com-
ment to relay content, or voices, from other sources, but, since such relayed content
is also recontextualised into a new discussion, the resultant participant roles of the
39What is meant by van Dijk’s reference to mental models, as he himself explains, is that “implicit
meanings are related to underlying beliefs, but are not openly, directly, completely or precisely
asserted, for various contextual reasons” (2001: 104).
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various voices can be quite complex. Against this background, we consider here
changes in participant roles in relation to both ﬁctive interaction, constructed dia-
logue and hyperlinks when it comes to the expression of hate in online reactions to
news items in Denmark.
We begin with an example of ﬁctive interaction that involves the manipulation of
person deixis. The relevant comment (example 33) is in response to an article in the
Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet reporting how a man, who was selling his car online,
was ﬁned for writing ‘Fuck you, you Muslim’ to a bidder with an obviously foreign
name, who offered what was viewed as an insultingly low price:
(33) Så dig, som vi her kan kalde Hr F. Muslim, tag dig sammen og prøv at forstå,
at selvom vi er yderst tolerante, er vi ikke dumme, dette giver dig ikke ret til at
skambyde på en bil eller andet du måtte ønske af os tolerante danskere. Hold
op med at lukrere på, at du er muslim, hvilken betydning har det egentligt for
os… Betal manden de 5000 kr. tilbage som han har fået i bøde, blot fordi du
pipper om din muslimske herkomst og opfører dig som en mand og ikke en
kylling.40
So you, who we here can call Mr. F. Muslim, pull yourself together and try to
understand that although we are extremely tolerant, we are not stupid, this
does not give you the right to make a disgracefully low offer on a car or
anything else you might want from us tolerant Danes. Stop exploiting that you
are a Muslim, what meaning does that have for us… Pay the man the 5000 kr
back that he got as a ﬁne just because you chirp about your Muslim origins
and act like a man and not a chicken.
This comment is structured as interaction by using the 2nd person pronoun ‘you’
and a derogatory term of address, Mr. F Muslim, that plays on and perpetuates the
original explicit language of the insult. This combination shifts the role of ﬁgure
(the character talked about) to the reception role of the (most probably) non-present
addressee. Moreover, the writer, who obviously is the author of the discourse, takes
a collective perspective and in so doing distributes the role of principal (the person
whose views or beliefs are established) across the in-group, ‘we’ Danes. The ﬁctive
dialogue then allows the writer to express a decidedly negative group stance
towards the individual concerned on the grounds of his religious identity and
towards his act of reporting the insult, while simultaneously portraying the in-group
in a positive light. Minority identity is constructed as a means by which members of
the minority group take unfair advantage of the put-upon in-group, and reporting
what could be viewed as a hate incident is associated with cowardice. Hence, what
is being legitimised is the discriminatory behaviour of the man selling the car.
The next example illustrates a different type of change in participant role, where
the writer of the comment takes on the character of ‘all the immigrants’ in a ﬁctive
interaction. This comment is in response to a leader article in the tabloid Ekstra
40Comment located at: http://ekstrabladet.dk/kup/forbrug/bilsaelger-faar-boede-skrev-fuck-dig-
din-muslim/5505138.
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Bladet about a reception being held for people who became Danish citizens during
the previous year.
(34) Stakkels Pensionister .. de får ingen pleje eller støtte i hjemmet, hospitalerne
har så få resourcer at de diskutere hvem der har et liv tilbage og som man vil
ofre en behandling på. Fedt med alle invandrene som kan ﬁnde vej til
Danmark og sige: ‘Maj ha penga .. manga penga’41
Poor Pensioners… they get no care or support in the home, hospitals have so
few resources that they discuss who will have a life back and who they will
devote treatment to. Awesome with all the immigrants who can ﬁnd their way
to Denmark and say ‘Me have monay…much monay’
In evidence is a form of ventriloquism (cf. Cooren 2012) where the author of the
text animates a generalised voice, manipulating pronouns and spelling to convey
poor, foreign-accented Danish and, thus, perpetuating the stereotype of immigrants
as having poor competences in Danish. At the same time, the content of what is said
plays on the prevalent stereotype that immigrants are only interested in receiving
welfare beneﬁts. The ﬁctive interaction functions as a means of negatively
stereotyping an entire group. However, it also serves to hold this group responsible,
since it shifts their role from the ﬁgure to the participant roles of both author, i.e.
their words, and principal, i.e. their beliefs. Embedded in a sarcastic construction,
the implied meaning is that it is far from ‘awesome’ that immigrants come to
Denmark demanding money and this interpretation is strengthened by the contex-
tual, and generalised, narrative about lack of resources for geriatric care and hos-
pital treatments.
We will now turn to the role of hyperlinks in the expression of hate speech
online. As noted by Klein, hate speech involves “the tactical employment of words,
images, and symbols, as well as links, downloads, news threads, conspiracy the-
ories, politics, and even pop culture” (2012: 428). The following comment relates to
a newspaper article again from Ekstra Bladet reporting the intention of the
Hungarian government to build a fence to keep refugees out.
(35) “Instant justice” til fup-flygtninge http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=1SCdXH
rykfI42
“Instant justice” to bogus refugees
This comment is clearly negative, given the categorisation ‘bogus refugees’, but the
link is integral to the comment if the exact nature of ‘instant justice’ is to be
identiﬁed. While the YouTube link was no longer accessible, having been removed
for copyright reasons, its original source was still visible: ‘liveleak migrants bea-
ten’. A search on LiveLeak suggests that the video was about ‘migrants beaten by
truck drivers in Calais’, and was also labelled as ‘shocking footage’. While
41Comment located at: http://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/lederen/hjertelig-velkommen/5539498.
42Comment located at: http://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/samfund/tv-ungarn-vil-holde-ﬂygtninge-
ude-med-hegn/5623681.
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LiveLeak makes no mention of ‘instant justice’, compilations of ‘instant justice’
can be found on YouTube, although not necessarily related to any group, sug-
gesting that the phrase has some form of memetic status. At one level, the writer of
the comment is relaying the video to others, but through the process of recontex-
tualisation, new meanings for this video have been created or authored by the
commenter. S/he has embedded the video in a textual context that legitimises
violence towards refugees as justice. In this respect, hyperlink use can arguably be
seen as some form of multimodal constructed dialogue.
Our ﬁnal example deals with issues of sexuality and originates from the national
broadsheet, Kristeligt Dagblad, which focuses on issues of faith, ethics and exis-
tence. The comment responds to an article about the decision of the US Supreme
Court to permit homosexual marriages.
(36) Indtil to med samme køn reproducerer sig selv, så vil jeg fastholde at
homoseksualitet er unaturligt i ordets egentlige betydning. http://www.mx.dk/
nyheder/aarhus/story/1627648243
Until two people with the same sex reproduce, I will maintain that homo-
sexuality is unnatural in the literal meaning of the word.
Here, the hyperlink is quasi-transparent, linking to an article in another Danish
newspaper Metro Express (21 June 2015), which is about how a politician caused a
considerable controversy by deleting from her Facebook proﬁle a question from a
well-known homosexual TV presenter, whom she subsequently blocked when he
continued to ask this question. This politician is a member of the right-wing Danish
Peoples’ Party and had been recently elected to Parliament, while the question at
hand related to her previous assertion, in 2013, that all kinds of family life besides
the traditional model were unnatural and against the laws of nature. Even though
she had back-pedalled from her statements at the time, the TV presenter raised the
issue again. The linked article is complex in terms of participant roles, with three
voices present: the journalist, the TV presenter and the politician. The journalist has
the roles of author and relayer, but since he inserts direct and indirect quotations
into a new context as constructed dialogue, the authorial role is paramount. The TV
presenter and the politician are both ﬁgures in that they are being talked about, but
they are also given the role of principal, as through the constructed dialogue their
positions and beliefs are established. The TV presenter, however, is the more
prevalent ﬁgure and principal in this article. Hence, the rhetorical function of the
link is ambiguous in a comment that posits the unnaturalness of homosexuality. The
commenter’s negative evaluation aligns only with the previous statement of the
politician so his focus seems to be on her role as principal regarding this former
position. It therefore seems that the relationship between a hyperlink and the
comment within which is it embedded may not always be transparent, as it was in
example (35) above, especially if the material within the link is itself complex.
43Comment located at: http://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/udland/et-forandret-usa-siger-ja-til-
homoseksuelle-aegteskaber.
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To conclude, our data points to the importance of indirect practices in the
expression of hate speech as interpreted broadly. The use of ﬁctive interaction,
constructed dialogue and hyperlinks can serve to perpetuate stereotypes, and nor-
malise and legitimise xenophobic and homophobic discourse as well as involve the
presumed online audience through creative rhetorical strategies.
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Chapter 4
Young People’s Perception of Hate Speech
The present chapter, much like the previous one, comprises a series of short sections,
each focusing on a particular aspect arising from the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. interview
discussions. The analyses adopt predominantly thematic qualitative approaches
embedded within various theoretical perspectives and are meant to explore the ways
in which young people perceive hate speech and matters associated with it. Again, it
should be noted that even though each section is based on a particular national
setting, the overall argumentation is of relevance to other contexts too, as well as to
the wider discussion of the speciﬁc phenomenon in focus. In this light, Sect. 4.1
examines the experiences of hate speech narrated by the interviewees in Poland in an
attempt to come up with recommendations for countering it and Sect. 4.2 follows
suit by examining the mobilisation of young people against discriminatory discourse
in the United Kingdom. In turn, Sect. 4.3 focuses on the relatively unexplored issue
of folk conceptualisations of hate speech, showing how interviewees in Denmark
characterise the concept of hate speech and its regulation, while Sect. 4.4 addresses
the thorny issue of freedom of expression when it comes to regulating hate speech in
Lithuania. Section 4.5 investigates the tendency of young people to be more
accepting of discriminatory comments against migrants rather than the LGBTIQ
community, identifying some reasons why xenophobia is so much on the rise when
compared to homophobia in Malta. Remaining on the issue of xenophobia, Sect. 4.6
focuses on the typical conflation of the categories of race and religion in xenophobic
talk in Cyprus, where anyone not conforming to the Greek Orthodox faith being
submitted to similar processes of Othering. Finally, turning to the investigation of
hate speech in the online setting, Sect. 4.7 zooms in on Italian youth perceptions of
the role that the media plays in the diffusion of discriminatory discourse in the digital
era, and Sect. 4.8 draws on the parallels between cyberhate and cyberbullying, by
focusing on online anonymity as a crucial factor that is perceived to motivate the
expression of hate on the internet in Spain.
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4.1 Youth and Hate Speech in the (Mediatised)
Public Sphere
Monika Kopytowska, Julita Woźniak and Łukasz Grabowski
Recent debates on freedom of speech on the one hand and incivility and hatred in
public discourse on the other have brought into the limelight the role of language as
a social agent in the public sphere. As argued by social constructivists and critical
discourse analysis scholars alike (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1966/1991; Fairclough
and Wodak 1997; Searle 1995, 2010), discursive representations of individuals,
groups, events, issues, phenomena and relations are both constituted by and con-
stitutive of the socio-political status-quo of these entities. Since contemporary
public discourse abounds in messages of hate, and research ﬁndings demonstrate
that there exists a link between verbal and physical aggression, it seems vital to
explore the dynamics of hate speech production and reception in the public sphere
in its current mediatised form.1
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere denotes “the space between civil society
and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest is
institutionally guaranteed.” (1989: xi). There are, according to him, two reasons
why discourse matters in the public sphere, or, to put it more aptly, two kinds of
actions accompanying public debate: strategic action and communicative action.
The former is meant to influence the behaviour of the audience by means of a
“threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratiﬁcation in order to cause the interaction
to continue as the ﬁrst actor desires,” while the latter is intended to “[rationally]
motivate […]other[s] by relying on the illusionary binding/bonding effect of the
offer contained in […a] speech act” (Habermas 1989: 58).
While globalisation has led to the emergence of a ‘global public sphere,’ ‘me-
diatisation’ has stretched the public sphere, in its traditional sense, beyond the
‘geospatial,’ or territorially bounded conﬁguration, via a ‘sociospatial,’ or online
virtual space conﬁguration (Youngs 2009). The mediatised public sphere (cf.
Kopytowska 2013, 2015a–c), which is created as a result of this process, constitutes
an online space where members of society can exchange socio-political opinions,
and collaborate in the construction of social reality via peer production. Its
near-instantaneous, dialogic, and decentralised nature and interactivity make it an
ultra-attractive site for extended socio-political debate. At the same time, however,
anonymity and global accessibility have transformed it into a tool for promoting
messages of hate and radicalism, by enabling previously diverse and fragmented
groups to connect and providing them with a sense of community that shares values,
ideologies and fears (Perry and Olsson 2009), while making such messages available
to mass publics (Duffy 2003) by removing the boundaries of time and space.2
1For a comprehensive overview of the performativity of hate speech, see Leezenberg (2015).
2For the role of anonymity in encouraging incivility among Internet users, see Santana (2014); for
the interface between anonymity, accountability for one’s words and tendency towards mental
shortcuts and simplistic judgements, see Tetlock (1983).
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Drawing on these theoretical insights and referring to the data collected during
the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project focus group interviews in Poland,3 we will discuss here
the interface between the (mediatised) public sphere and hate speech/hate crime as
perceived and experienced by the youth in Poland (including foreigners studying
here) with a view to coming up with possible recommendations for counteracting
these phenomena. Overall, the relevant issues discussed in these interviews can be
linked to several concepts, namely accessibility, anonymity in the absence of
face-to-face interaction, permanence and pervasiveness of messages, public
awareness, and ‘performativity of hate speech’.
As observed by the students who took part in the interviews, while the medi-
atisation of the public sphere has resulted in an overall increase of the amount of
hate speech, it has also made the society more aware of the existence of the
phenomenon—hence the importance of the historical permanence of online written
discourses in contrast to the transient nature of face-to-face communication. As one
of the participants characteristically pointed out,
(37) such opinions remain in the public sphere and are more salient; earlier
someone could say something and it just ‘faded away’.
(P2, FG1)4
Accordingly, both anonymity and lack of direct face-to-face interaction are seen
as factors behind incivility in the virtual public sphere:
(38) The fact that there is no direct contact with the other person also matters
(…) One can afford to say much more than in face-to-face interaction.
(P1, FG1)
(39) People feel unrestricted because of anonymity. They believe they can say
anything and give vent to all sorts of emotions.
(P2, FG2)
At the same time, however, the documented increase in the amount of hate
speech online can be attributed to the escalation of fear in the current socio-political
context (terrorism, migrant crisis, radicalisation), and while it is undesirable, it is
still better, as one of the interviewees believes, that such an outburst of emotions
takes place in the cyberspace and not publicly, or, as she puts it, in the “material
world”, that is, in the streets (P1, FG4).
Yet, the issue of cyber-violence and its potential effects in the real world is also
salient, ﬁrstly, because of its quantitative nature, in the sense of accumulating hate
speech,
3Six focus-group interviews were conducted among 22 individuals in total, all students at either the
University of Łodź or University of Opole.
4Throughout this chapter, the abbreviated forms ‘Px’ and ‘FGy’ will be used as identiﬁers of
particular interviewees, by referring to the relevant participant and focus group number in each
national interview transcript database. Also, due to space restrictions, only a translation of the
relevant interviewees’ original utterances into English, when these were produced in a language
other than English, will be provided in this instance.
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(40) a bulk of some threats may exert such a pressure on someone that he or she
will resort to crime in the real world.
(P2, FG3)
and then, due to the fact that such hate speech is widely accessible to various types
of audiences, for whom it may act as a trigger for the already active prejudice and
hatred.
(41) If we look at the statement that “each Paki and Nigger trash should get a
9 mm bullet in between the eyes”…there are different people and masses of
people on the Internet. […] Some, like us will just laugh at it, while someone
else after reading it will reach for a gun with 9 mm bullets, go to the street,
and seeing the ﬁrst person with Middle Eastern or African origin, will lit-
erally take out this gun and ﬁre…
(P3, FG3)
Accordingly, as pointed out by several individuals, the existence of Facebook
groups inciting to violence, like for example ‘Stop islamizacji Europy’ [Stop the
Islamisation of Europe] may become motivation and pretext for fanatics.
While it is generally assumed that more ‘distance’, in the sense of critical
thinking, is expected in the case of interactions within the virtual public sphere, it is
also acknowledged that this type of environment, which blurs the boundaries
between fact and ﬁction, is conducive to possible prejudice and discriminatory
behaviour. Still, on a positive note, the Internet is also perceived as
(42) the only medium within public sphere that is free of restrictions
(P1, FG1)
and a place where one can get information that is unavailable (censored) via other
channels, such as what one of the participants referred to as “the truth” concerning
refugee violence against women in Germany or Sweden (P1, FG1). Hence, a bal-
ance should be struck between “uncivil discourse and selectivity-inducing political
correctness” (P1, FG4).
Opinions concerning reactions to hate speech in both the physical and virtual
public sphere seem to be divided. On the one hand, penalising online hate speech is
viewed as something that should be commonly accepted and obvious:
(43) just as one can be ﬁned for vulgar speech in the street and it is not perceived
as restriction on the freedom of speech.
(P2, FG4)
But on the other hand, when it comes to how ‘ordinary’ citizens should react to hate
speech incidents, reactions to hate-motivated verbal or physical violence seems to
be more desirable in the physical world, while in the networked public sphere,
inaction is more likely to be perceived as the right attitude, as it does not contribute
to the escalation of hate. As one of the interviewees puts it, reacting to online hate
speech amounts to “feeding the troll” (P2, FG1), since many haters simply want to
be noticed and engage in an endless debate.
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Importantly, as argued by some of the interviewees, to properly counter the
phenomenon of hate speech in the public sphere, both in the physical and virtual
dimension, more should be done in terms of public awareness and education, since
(44) hate speech results simply from people’s lack of knowledge and fear of the
unknown.
(P1, FG3)
As shown by this discussion of the interviews concerning the public perception
of hate speech among young people living in Poland, there exists considerable
social acceptance of verbal abuse and aggression in online communication. At the
same time, our interviewees point to the need of raising public awareness and
fostering education that enables individuals to understand and appreciate the links
between legal instruments, law enforcement and the social acceptance of hate
speech in online and offline modes of communication, both private and public—or
to use again Habermas’ concepts, between strategic action and communicative
action in the context of public deliberation.
4.2 Resistance Against Hate Speech: Generation
‘Snowflake’ or Generation ‘Woke’?
Georgia Whitaker
Following the EU referendum in June 2016, hate speech and hate crime ﬁgures
increased by 58% across the UK (National Police Chief’s Council 2016). One year
on, this trend is still evident, with Islamophobic hate crime increasing by ﬁvefold
since the London Bridge terrorist attacks (Travis 2017). Major UK NGOs such as
Amnesty UK have launched emergency campaigns to address the issue (Amnesty
International 2017), yet the ‘millennial generation’5 have been tackling hate speech
long before the EU referendum occurred.
In this section, I explore how British youth have moulded a more radical deﬁ-
nition of hate speech which advances on Loewenstein’s theory of Militant
Democracy (1937). Following the EU referendum, resistance against hate speech
has been politicised, as part of a ‘remoaner’6 agenda, or worse, a characteristic of
generation ‘Snowflake’.7 Yet the British millennial generation represented in the
5The term ‘millennials’ generally refers to the generation of people born between the early 1980s
and the early 2000s (Main 2013).
6The term ‘remoaner’ refers to a person who vociferously opposes Britain’s exit from the
European Union (Stromme 2016).
7As we will very shortly see, ‘snowflake’ is used in this setting in an informal, derogatory way to
denote an overly sensitive or easily offended young person, or someone who believes they are
entitled to special treatment on account of their supposedly unique characteristics.
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C.O.N.T.A.C.T. interview data resist these labels, deﬁning themselves instead as
generation ‘Woke’ in their activism against hate speech.
The term ‘Woke’ was actually added to the Oxford English Dictionary as
recently as June 2017 (Steinmetz 2017):
‘Woke’, adjective
Originally: well-informed, up-to-date. Now chiefly: alert to racial or social discrimination
and injustice; frequently in stay woke.
The term itself is not exclusive to the U.K, and originates from the U.S. Black Lives
Matter movement connoting an awareness of racial and social justice and resistance
against “structural violence” (Galtung 1969). Whilst it is now used outside the
Black Lives Matter movement, being ‘woke’ is still largely deﬁned by (but not
excluded to) racial issues (Hess 2016). Woke activists endeavour to ‘call out’ others
on their ‘privilege’ and conscious or unconscious prejudices prevalent due to
patriarchal and post-colonial societal structures (cf. Said 1978).
During our C.O.N.T.A.C.T. interviews,8 one interviewee reflected on becoming
‘woke’ through a process of self-education:
(45) Before I would have banter with people and say things I shouldn’t say and
people would say things to me that they shouldn’t really say and now, as I’ve
gotten older, done my research, and I’ve become more aware of what’s ok
and what’s not ok. So if anyone ever said anything to me that felt was out of
order now then I’d 100% report it. I mean our generation is the ‘woke’
generation.
(Interviewee 9)
Amongst our interviewees, hate speech has taken a bolder, more radical deﬁ-
nition. This new perception of hate speech embraces EU and UN deﬁnitions of hate
speech, yet expands upon them. Racist hate speech is no longer regarded as
comprising racial slurs alone, but also as including post-colonial nuances.
Furthermore, interviewees incorporated stigma against sexuality, gender and par-
ticularly transgender rights in their deﬁnition of hate speech. All in all, the ‘woke’
generation recognise hate speech as a by-product of societal power imbalances,
which an interviewee explains as follows:
(46) Hate speech is something which uses someone’s privilege and power in
society against someone without that privilege. Different characteristics have
different markers of power in society and people use those characteristics to
insult someone and go against someone; that would be hate speech.
(Interviewee 2)
Being ‘woke’ involves introspection and an acute awareness of one’s own
power, or ‘privilege’ in society due to the intersectional attributes of their identity;
8Twelve individual interviews with young people in the UK were carried out following the
common C.O.N.T.A.C.T. methodology.
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most notably their race. ‘Privilege’ refers to unequal opportunities by virtue of
one’s identity and subsequent immunity to discrimination (McIntosh 1989). On this
front, interviewees suggested that being ‘woke’ requires ‘checking’ one’s privilege
constantly, and recognising where their life experience exempts them from an
understanding of racism, sexism, homophobia and other prejudices. In the fol-
lowing example, one interviewee reflects on how his privilege exempts them from
experiencing hate speech:
(47) I haven’t experienced hate speech as a white cis male
(Interviewee 3).
There is general consensus in ‘woke’ circles that white people cannot be subject
to racism, as self-identifying men cannot be subject to sexism (Houlston 2017). For
example, an interviewee described an incident where a student ofﬁcer at the notably
‘radical’ Goldsmiths university provoked controversy by tweeting
“#KillAllWhiteMen” (Telegraph 2015). In keeping with ‘woke’ conceptions of hate
speech, she argued that as a woman of colour she could not be racist. With power
and privilege in mind, the interviewee here highlights this incident as an example of
imbalances in police protection and scrutiny on the basis of patriarchy and racism:
(48) It’s like that Baha Mustafa thing; someone will say kill all white men and
then all of a sudden they are under investigation.
(Interviewee 4)
Interviewees strongly agreed on the importance of giving the victim the right to
choose how to respond to experiences of hate crime off their own accord. One
interviewee who had experienced hate speech argued that direct person attacks
often prevent the victim’s ability to ‘call out’ hate speech due to emotional distress
and exhaustion.
(49) I, as a woman of colour, really struggle speaking to someone I would deﬁne
as racist because I don’t think it’s my job to make them less racist.
(Interviewee 10)
The interviewee here raises the issue of responsibility, and the concept of ‘allies’
which is well-known in millennial ‘woke’ circles. An ‘ally’, in this context, is
someone who claims no authority in understanding this discrimination, yet can call
out and educate a perpetrator unaffected by an issue by virtue of their identity (Hess
2016). In turn, another interviewee elaborated on the importance of allies using
their privilege in order to resist hate speech:
(50) I don’t think it should be hijab Muslim women who go and speak to BNP
sympathisers, but your nice average white liberal man who just wants to do
something could have that conversation. The work of having those conver-
sations is left to the people who are most likely to experience the intolerance
and allies in the room get to say nothing and not be awkward or disruptive.
(Interviewee 4)
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The practice of ‘safe spaces’ and ‘no-platforming’ across universities and mil-
lennial communities in the UK is intended to banish those who advocate language
considered to mark hateful assaults to people’s dignity. Critics, including Britain’s
Prime Minister Theresa May, have attacked millennial’s attempts to curtail what
they perceive as hate speech as assaults on freedom of speech itself (Hughes 2016).
Yet interviewees were highly sceptical of this argument:
(51) Private individuals saying ‘don’t say that, that is racist’ is not censorship!
It’s totally legitimate; it’s not the government saying people can’t speak; it’s
you can speak where you want but we won’t be there to listen. Ultimately I
think that there is a false dichotomy set up between lovers of freedom of
speech and so called safer spaces crews, and it plays into all kinds of
nefarious agendas.
(Interviewee 4)
Turning to references to the millennial generation as generation ‘Snowflake,’
following the EU-referendum and Donald Trump’s election campaign (Nicholson
2016), the term ‘Snowflake’ has often been used by ‘Brexiteers’ such as Michael
Gove (Waugh 2017).
Snowflake, noun
informal, derogatory: an overly sensitive or easily offended person, or one who believes
they are entitled to special treatment on account of their supposedly unique characteristics.
‘these little snowflakes will soon discover that life doesn’t come with trigger warnings’
(Oxford Living Dictionaries 2017a)
The term ‘snowflake’ is essentially an insult to the millennial generation, as it
describes them as self-righteously believing that they are as precious and unique as
snowflakes. Furthermore, the delicate, breakable metaphor of a snowflake indicates
how easily offended the millennial generation are by perceived hate speech.
Far beyond questions of freedom of speech, advocates of the insult ‘snowflake’
have been known to sneer at the focus on the emotional effects of hate speech which
millennial interviewees identiﬁed:
(52) Hate speech is any kind of speech or incident where someone is making you
feel lesser than them or undermined or angry or upset in any way.
(Interviewee 8)
Interviewees of colour expressed particular concern regarding the rise of hate
speech following the EU referendum:
(53) Black and brown people are terriﬁed. There’s a lot of fear mongering with
regards to Muslim people and the Muslim communities. And white people
are afraid because they’ve been told to be.
(Interviewee 5)
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The term ‘snowflake’ has been used proliﬁcally worldwide as an insult by far
right groups such as alt-right (Roy 2016). This has for some, including this inter-
viewee, resulted in a loss of conﬁdence in reporting hate speech:
(54) [Reporting hate speech] made me lose faith. It also makes you feel like a bit
of a tell tale and particularly at the moment the whole narrative of being a
left liberal elite snowflake made me feel not so great.
(Interviewee 11)
Our interview participants regarded digital spaces as places of community where
resistance to hate speech can be easily co-ordinated and galvanised. A community
responsibility was seen as an alternative way to resist online hate without regulation
from the police or social media corporations:
(55) There’s a group that I’m part of on Facebook which is for women and none-
binary people which is this inclusive space that often there are campaigns on
that group to flag up a particular group to get behind supporting something
in a short space of time. There’s a community responsibility to flag things up.
(Interviewee 6)
Yet, there was also scepticism concerning whether online collective resistance
against hate speech effectively changed the minds of perpetrators in a productive
manner:
(56) One has to think very carefully about the difference between expressing
outrage in solidarity that can have value and actually communicating in a
way that is actually going to change somebody’s mind and both of those
things often need to happen.
(Interviewee 4)
As there was also concern that involvement in online resistance to hate speech may
prevent millennials from resisting hate speech offline in their personal lives. Those
in question are often described as ‘keyboard warriors’.9
(57) The hard work of engaging with people often doesn’t get done because
people think well I’ve tweeted in solidarity my job is done and all the time in
real life they don’t have those difﬁcult conversations with people around
them.
(Interviewee 4)
Finally, whilst interviewees were strong advocates of community-regulation,
most were highly sceptical of any sort of government intervention against hate
speech:
9A person who makes abusive or aggressive posts on the Internet, typically one who conceals their
true identity (Oxford Living Dictionary 2017b).
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(58) The government cannot be trusted with people’s data! The government have
their cards on the table as to who they care about and who they don’t so I
don’t really trust the government to police online platforms well. I think we
need to organise ourselves as private individuals to deal with things like this.
(Interviewee 4)
All in all, the qualitative results of the British C.O.N.T.A.C.T. interviews reflect
a microcosm of a wider geo-political youth movement which may in turn shift
deﬁnitions of hate speech whilst the millennial generation increasingly adopt
positions of socio-political power. Contemporarily, the evolved deﬁnitions of hate
speech discussed are likely to be too radical for the general population to be
regulated into law. Yet, the millennial generation show no explicit interest in leg-
islation on three counts;
1. scepticism as to whether laws would be fairly enforced
2. a preference for community resistance
3. self-induced moral obligations to ‘stay woke’ and reject hate speech are stronger
than legal obligations.
This raises wider questions surrounding tackling hate speech. A tendency to heavily
rely on the law ignores the fact that juridical punishment often fails victims of hate
speech, and provides no moral lesson for perpetrators. What the ‘woke’ generation
demonstrates is that tackling hate speech requires the work of communities to
promote a moral obligation to treat one another with dignity, with a retrospective
awareness of the historical origins of hate speech and “structural violence” (Galtung
1969). With this grassroots or bottom up approach, law can be more trusted, and
respected.
4.3 Folk Characterisations of Hate Speech
Sharon Millar, Rasmus Nielsen, Anna Vibeke Lindø and Klaus Geyer
Brown (2017) argues that hate speech as a concept is no longer conﬁned to aca-
demic and legal circles, but has currency among the general public and, hence,
requires new lines of investigation from the lay perspective. To this end, he pro-
poses that hate speech might be best approached in terms of prototypical charac-
teristics: are there elements that people tend to associate with hate speech, such as
minority groups, insults, the possibility of regulation? Since there has been little
work done on the perception of hate speech in the Danish context, the data pre-
sented here, deriving from ﬁve focus group interviews with 20 university students,
can be seen as a modest beginning. In this section, we make no claim to proto-
typicality, but will attempt to identify those characteristics that the interviewees
homed in on, ﬁrst when asked to deﬁne hate speech themselves and later when
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presented with already formulated deﬁnitions. More speciﬁcally, we will focus on
popular or folk conceptual understandings of hate speech, mindful of research that
emphasises the lack of transparency surrounding hate speech as a concept, since, as
Boromisza-Habashi correctly notes, hate speech is imbued with local meanings and
has its own “cultural life” (2013: 5).
When participants were asked what they understood hate speech to be, the
majority either explicitly or implicitly referred to groups (group membership, group
identity) or group processes (stereotyping, generalising):
(59) hate speech which when there is someone who openly talks down to groups
of marginalised people.
(P3, FG4)
(60) when you speciﬁcally and on purpose attack somebody for their personality
which is like you know for example sexuality or gender or skin colour or that
kind of thing.
(P2, FG1)
(61) you talk about women or Muslims in general or Jews in general instead of
thinking that there can also be lots of different people
(P3, FG3)
(62) stereotypical things you like put on some person or other … in a conde-
scending, wicked way
(P3, FG1)
Within these deﬁnitions, we see named group characteristics, such as gender,
religion, skin colour, or broader labels, such as marginalised people. A few par-
ticipants, however, also emphasised very speciﬁc groups:
(63) more discriminatory about other races
(P4, FG2)
(64) gender and sexuality. Often if it is gender so women who get attacked by men
if they dare to be part of a public debate.
(P2, FG3)
Participants also gave indications of how hate speech manifests itself, but this
was mostly expressed in broad terms. Hate speech can be condescension, attacking,
generalising, stereotyping, talking in a nasty or wicked way. One participant was
more speciﬁc, focusing in on threat and incitement to violence:
(65) It’s you know the degree to whether it invites violence or not. And to whether
it is threatening or just a prejudice
(P3, FG5)
The idea of intention, a thorny subject in the legal literature, also occasionally
appears: hate speech is done “on purpose” (P2, FG1) or has “an evil intention
behind it” (P1, FG1).
4.3 Folk Characterisations of Hate Speech 63
Turning to how participants responded to the four differing deﬁnitions of hate
speech they were presented with, including the issue of whether such speech should
be legislated against, it should be noted that all deﬁnitions speciﬁed the same
protected grounds (nationality, skin colour, ethnic origins, religion, gender and
sexual orientation). Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 described hate speech in terms of,
respectively, making negative, prejudiced remarks, and offending/insulting (Danish
verb “fornærme”). The reactions to these two deﬁnitions were very similar. The
majority felt that they both captured the idea of hate speech, but one participant did
not consider prejudiced remarks to come under the hate speech umbrella. Everyone
agreed that both deﬁnitions should not be subject to any form of legislation for
ideological reasons concerning freedom of speech and practical reasons in relation
to the wording and enforcement of any such laws:
(66) Again, one is moving into a dangerous zone. Okay what can one say and
what can one not say. So it’ll become a totalitarian state.
(P3, FG2)
(67) I mean I think it would be really, really difﬁcult to formulate some kind of
proposed law against this type (prejudiced remarks)
(P1, FG2)
Interestingly, however, in relation to deﬁnition 2 (insulting/offending), there was
a sense in one focus group that this was more of a grey area in relation to
legislation:
(68) This is a bit more serious you know because it is, it when you consciously…
(P4, FG2)
(69) Yeah so you almost attack.
(P3, FG2)
Insulting/offending then is perceived as more serious than making prejudiced
comments as this involves a deliberate attack on someone. Context is also seen as
important when it comes to regulating this form of hate speech; it all depends on
who initiates the hate speech and why (e.g. Is it individuals or hate groups? Is it due
to emotion or ideology?)
(70) When you are upset with someone, so you can also say some hate speech
things, can’t you? But I mean there is again this limit because there are
these, like, for example, gangs, like, for example, White Pride and things like
that, which are practically an organisation based on hate. Where again,
where is the limit?
(P4, FG2)
The third deﬁnition encompassed the notion of threat, which was rarely men-
tioned explicitly by participants when giving their own deﬁnitions of hate speech.
Part of the reason for this may be that threats seem to be viewed as possible criminal
actions.
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(71) When you threaten somebody so you are actually all of a sudden in a
completely different place than if you just say bad things about their religion
or skin colour or sexuality but if you directly threaten people so I think that is
something completely different.
(P3, FG1)
(72) So you go over and it becomes like a hate crime
(P2, FG1)
(73) to threaten it, it is also hate speech but I think also you (mumbling) the
border to hate crime where it begins not to be just words
(P4, FG2)
There was complete agreement that this deﬁnition of hate speech required legis-
lation, although mitigating contextual issues, such as empty threats made in the heat
of the moment, were also touched upon.
The ﬁnal deﬁnition covered incitement to violence and hate, which was only
referred to by one person when discussing personal understandings of hate speech.
Reactions to this deﬁnition were more ambiguous. It was acknowledged as covering
hate speech, but one focus group considered it a more indirect type.
(74) It is not direct hate speech to a person.
(P4, FG2)
(75) It is of course some form of hate speech but it isn’t… it is more indirect…
Because it, yeah, if it was me and I said to this here (mumbles)… Go over
there and thump him. So I didn’t say it directly to the person over there and
so like the way I have understood it on the face of it, it’s not direct hate
speech.
(P3, FG2)
Views on legislating this form of hate speech were divided as it was seen as a very
grey area, dependent on context (such as when it is hate groups inciting to vio-
lence), and individual interpretation. There were fears that it could end up in a
“blame game” situation (P4, FG2) involving “your word against mine” (P1, FG2).
To sum up, the participants’ own understandings of hate speech generally point
to the group nature of the concept and describe its characteristics in broad terms,
such as using condescending, nasty language, stereotyping and generalising. Their
understandings for the most part ﬁt with deﬁnitions of hate speech that deal with
prejudice and offence/insult. Notions of threat and encouraging violence were not
explicitly raised by students themselves, although one participant did see these as
deﬁning features of hate speech. Threatening behaviour, however, was considered
to be very serious and criminal. This was the only deﬁnition of hate speech that
provoked consensus in favour of legislation. Perhaps surprisingly, the deﬁnition of
hate speech as incitement to violence and hate was met with some ambivalence.
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4.4 Thoughts on Regulating Hate Speech
Tatsiana Chulitskaya
In recent years, hate speech has become a recognised problem to be addressed at
both the national and international level. Regulations of hate speech are “connected
with the use of words which are deliberately abusive and/or insulting and/or
threatening and/or demeaning directed at members of vulnerable minorities, cal-
culated to stir up hatred against them” (Waldron 2012: 8–9). However, such reg-
ulations provoke extensive debates as to whether liberal democracy must take
afﬁrmative responsibility for protecting the atmosphere of mutual respect against
certain forms of attacks. If it must, then what are the proper forms, and where are
the limits of hate speech regulations?
Herz and Molnar (2012) claim that in the West the maximalist idea of an
offense-free society is shaped by the long-existing tradition of freedom of expres-
sion, which is embedded and practiced in mature democracies. But even there, the
scope of hate speech laws should not be taken for granted and needs to remain in
the focus of public reflection. For instance, in the past few decades, laws forbidding
Holocaust denial have at times been criticised as controversial limitations on
freedom of expression (Bleich 2011). In order to avoid such controversies, some
authors claim that it is necessary for hate speech regulations to be developed on a
case-by-case basis, rather than being entirely content-based (Hertz and Molnar
2012), since the domestic political context of an era needs to also be taken into
account (Bleich 2011). This approach, that is, a case-by-case evaluation of hate
speech instances while placing them in the current political context, seem extremely
important for Lithuania.
On the basis of the focus group interviews that we conducted following the
common C.O.N.T.A.C.T. methodology,10 I will now briefly discuss how local
participants, who are not only Lithuanian nationals, but also representatives of other
nationalities—in particular, of the Russian-speaking minority, understand hate
speech and where they stand in relation to the free speech debate.
In our focus group discussions, hate speech was deﬁned and characterised as the
usage of speciﬁc words, expressions and intonation that targets human dignity
(example 76), while reference was also made to stereotyping and having biased
opinions (example 77). Apart from this, the perpetrator’s intention to cause harm
through hate speech was particularly underlined (example 78),
(76) When somebody tells you, that you are different and that’s why you are
worse than they are.
(P3, FG1)
10We conducted two focus groups in Lithuania, with 10 participants in the ﬁrst and 15 in the
second.
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(77) … usually when we speak about ‘hate speech’, we mean a negative
assumption based on different backgrounds. [You don’t focus] on the fact
that somebody just offended you, but [on the fact that] they used a biased
opinion, a stereotype, which was not created by you yourself, but by society.
(P4, FG1)
(78) The worst scenario is when hate speech is a deliberate [action].
(P1, FG2)
According to our interviewees, hate speech includes both threats and insults
(examples 79 and 80)—to such an extent that some even consider the boundaries
between hate speech and verbal abuse blurry (examples 81 and 82). Yet, not all
instances of discriminatory discourse are considered prosecutable: some qualify as
hate speech in the legal sense, while other are just cases of intolerant, yet per-
missible, talk (example 83).
(79) I just cannot understand why we need to differentiate between an insult, a
threat and hate speech, when in fact they are quite the same.
(P8, FG2)
(80) I just realised that hate speech is a broad concept for deﬁning what people
do in order to show their dislike and hatred towards some other groups of
people. It includes insults, and humiliation, and threats.
(P2, FG1)
(81) In the Criminal Code, there has already been an article against insulting.
I don’t really understand why we need to deﬁne ‘hate speech’ separately…
(P7, FG2)
(82) I don’t really understand why we need to deﬁne ‘hate speech’ separately
because of religion, if it’s wrong to insult someone anyway.
(P9, FG1)
(83) [the difference between suggested deﬁnitions of hate speech] is in the degree
of hatred. If [some deﬁnitions] are about expression of thoughts, then [other
deﬁnitions] are about something more serious concerning crimes or some
criminal actions.
(P2, FG2)
Turning to the issue of how the regulation of hate speech affects freedom of
expression, most participants thought that “freedom of speech should be guaran-
teed” (P5, FG2); yet, some also expressed fear about how people actually use this
freedom:
(84) [reading hate speech comments] “I think about freedom of speech and I get
scared. That’s why I never read comments to news. And thank God for that,
if they are writing such things there. Why should you waste your time on
such things? … I have difﬁculty with formulating my thoughts, when I see
such expressions, or hear somebody say something like this… When people
are insulted – I just lose ability to speak… I cannot think clearly”.
(P4, FG2)
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The same pattern is also evident when it comes to the necessity of legally regulating
hate speech. As we have already seen, there are, on the one hand, some participants
who question the need to legally deﬁne hate speech as a separate crime, and think
that cases of hate speech should be incorporated into other laws as aggravating
circumstances, rather than targeted by a separate law. But on the other, there are
others who were supportive of the separate legislation on hate speech.
(85) I agree that it is possible to create a separate law on hate speech.
(P10, FG1)
(86) I agree that we need them [laws on hate speech], because we should combat
insults in general.
(P6, FG2)
At the same time, respondents also expressed doubts about the proper imple-
mentation of the existing legislation in Lithuania. To begin with, they believe that
even though such laws may exist, people are not always aware of them, and they are
not typically followed in everyday life. So, victims are often forced to press charges
in order to get justice.
(87) I just think that in order for the laws to work, people need to get [the hate
speech cases] to the court. Because the problem [of hate speech] exists, but
not all the people will go to the authorities and point it out.
(P4, FG1)
In parallel, the importance of making the general public familiar with laws against
hate speech was also underlined (example 88), but almost everyone agreed that the
most important role in combating hate speech lies with education (example 89).
(88) … [what is needed is] to popularise it [the law against hate speech] through
the media in order to change the situation somehow. Maybe this will
increase the cultural level [sic] of the people.
(P2, FG2)
(89) Preventive measures are better than punishment. I mean education, inter-
cultural discursive ethics, trying to explain to kids from a young age that
everything is ﬁne and people can be different…
(P9, FG2)
Striking a balance between freedom of expression and regulation of hate speech is
a difﬁcult task in any national context. Being part of a predominantly academic
debate, this problem remains mostly unresolved on the practical, political and legal
level, which are more focused on deﬁning hate speech content, and ﬁnding appro-
priate tools for combating it, rather than on its actual contextualisation. Overall, the
results of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. research in Lithuania demonstrates that while our
interview participants are in general familiar with the concept of hate speech, they
make no particular distinction among the actions that constitute hate speech, and
express doubts about how the legislation of hate speech is actually implemented in
practice. So, they see the media, education and public awareness campaigns as more
important tools for dealing with hate speech than legal measures.
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4.5 It All Depends on Who Discrimination Targets
Stavros Assimakopoulos and Rebecca Vella Muskat
As already mentioned in Sect. 2.1 (cf. footnote 14 there), much like in other
countries of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project, our research in Malta showed that xeno-
phobia is far more widespread than homophobia in the local setting. What was
rather surprising, however, was that the results of the online questionnaire that was
administered locally gave us a clear indication that participants were much more
willing to label homophobic, rather than xenophobic comments as hate speech. This
was particularly odd, since all the examples of ‘potential’ hate speech that were
provided in the questionnaire were selected on the basis of the same criteria for both
kinds of discrimination. So, during the interview11 phase of our research, one of our
main aims was to discover why that might be the case, and a number of interesting
points were indeed raised by our interviewees.
According to most focus group participants, while the LGBTIQ community has
moved forward in legislation and general acceptance within the Maltese society in
recent years, migrants are still very much left on the periphery. Progressive laws
and strong activism has ensured that members of the LGBTIQ community are
granted rights and privileges that are the same as their heterosexual, cisgendered
peers. In turn, this has also granted the LGBTIQ community widespread positive
publicity. In addition to the positive narrative surrounding the LGBTIQ community
in Malta, our interviewees also pointed out that persons of LGBTIQ identities are
part of the Maltese fabric, as family members and friends, while migrants are
viewed with suspicion, as outsiders.
(90) … nowadays, it’s not such a taboo topic anymore, so people are coming out
of their shells, like ‘hey I’m gay’ ok, so now it’s acceptable. And now
families, like Maltese families, they have family members who are also gay,
so they’ve become more acceptable. So, that’s closer to home I guess,
because they’re part of us, they’re our family. So, ok, we can accept them,
but they’re from another culture, they’re Arabs, Muslim… so no.
(P5, FG1)
(91) … because they are Maltese people, deﬁnitely, like they’re born here so it’s
ﬁne. They identify as homosexual and that’s ok. Immigrants, they came here,
we’re letting them stay here. So it’s like they should be ok with everything,
they shouldn’t ask for anything, it’s enough that we’re keeping them here so
the kind of mentality is that they do not belong here … the LGBTIQ com-
munity obviously in the last few decades raised a lot of awareness and people
are understanding more now the dynamics of it … Immigration, I think, it’s
because they are not nationals, the ideology that they do not belong here.
(P4, FG4)
11For this part of the project, we conducted 4 focus group interviews with 5 participants each. It
should also be noted that 4 of our participants were slightly over 35 years of age.
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(92) And I think also politics or mass media has an effect on this, like if you look
at recent times … there have been progressive laws so the introduction of
civil [union] rights and now it’s being discussed to include [gay] marriage
whereas when we are speaking about immigration we take this kind of stance
… they do not belong here, let’s ﬁnd a place where to put them. So the state
is already giving kind of this ideology of LGBTIQ is ok, immigration isn’t…
(P4, FG4)
Hence, people are less likely to tolerate speech that discriminates against one of
their own, than speech that victimises a person that they deem to be unrelated to
them. Moreover, as one participant also pointed out, since there is this propensity in
recent years to actively not discriminate against LGBTIQ community in Malta,
even people who are less inclined to accept the community are less willing to
tolerate hate speech targeted at them out of peer pressure.
(93) Cause people don’t want to seem homophobic. If the rest of society is not
homophobic, they don’t want to be the odd one out, so, if society is pro-
gressive will act progressive like it, but still have their own views…
(P3, FG1)
Turning to why our interview participants feel that there may be a greater
acceptance of xenophobic comments in our data, the most common explanation
given was that migrants bring a strong feeling of perceived threat among the
Maltese; a perceived threat that can be attributed to a number of reasons.
(94) I think most people in Malta, I mean with immigration, they see immigrants
like “ah they’re taking what’s ours”
(P1, FG2)
(95) They’re taking something away, some people feel so.
(P4, FG2)
The most commonplace argument among our interviewees appears to be that the
fear of migrants partly stems from a fear that migrants will take the jobs that the
Maltese are vying for and there would, therefore, be a shortage of jobs on the
market, thus leaving many Maltese unemployed:
(96) … this idea that immigrants like don’t belong here and that it’s much
stronger than in the comments in the street like “send him back to his
country”, “they’re taking our jobs” and stuff like that so, they’re more likely
to witness it.
(P4, FG4)
(97) In fact, I don’t know what some of the comments were, most of the comments
which I’ve read are all about “oh they’re taking away our jobs.”
(P4, FG2)
At the same time, there appears to be the perception that, along with so-called
“genuine” migrants, there are also too many “illegitimate” migrants, who are either
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criminals and/or simply trying to take advantage of the system and scrounge off the
state:
(98) … you have a whole spectrum of people, immigrants. You get refugees,
people who are genuinely out for better opportunities, and then you get, um,
maybe, um, younger people. Generally they tend to be young men who
simply, who are simply looking for opportunities, but maybe because of the
system or whatever, they become idle and they fall in, I don’t know, cir-
cumstances, um, resulting in them falling in with the wrong crowd or them
doing petty crimes because as well of the system …
(P1, FG1)
(99) And just the good ones, which are more, get stuck and get a bad reputation
because of others …
(P2, FG2)
(100) many people who are here and who are taking, in air quotes, our jobs aren’t
really illegal immigrants or immigrants from certain countries, you know …
There’s a mix. … obviously in everything in life there are the good ones and
the bad ones.
(P2, FG2)
However, apart from reasons that have more to do with practical aspects of
everyday life, our interviewees also pointed out that migrants are bound to face
more discrimination than other minorities in Malta due to cultural differences too. In
congruence with much mainstream political discourse, as noted by one of our
interview participants (see example 102), there appears to be the idea in society that
migration will erase or damage Maltese culture and, as such, many Maltese reject
multiculturalism.
(101) This is a very sensitive issue, um, I think. This issue of the, you know,
multiculturalism in Malta. We’ve only been monocultural for many years.
It’s only in recent decades that I think, or… with this thing of immigration
has only been a hot issue in the last 10, 15 years maybe. So now, um, I think
it’s, the Maltese are very insular … and they don’t take well to change, as
any society I imagine … Multiculturalism is new, therefore.
(P1, FG1)
(102) But the mainstream political discourse on the subject of multiculturalism
and immigration actually reinforces racism.
(P5, FG3)
(103) The issues that arise out of multiculturalism affect all areas of life cause
there’s culture, there’s religion, there’s…
(P3, FG3)
And, indeed, as the comment in (103) mentions, religion is often considered a main
feature of the Maltese identity. Malta has a long Catholic tradition, which has,
throughout recent history, been protected dearly, and which is still very present in
everyday practices. With over 90% of the country being Catholic and also
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following the recent spike of religious terrorism across the EU, several Maltese
people have started to develop an Islamophobic attitude:
(104) … even for people who have no problems with Muslims per se, but then,
when you start seeing your, I guess, people feel nervous when they see their
neighbourhood being transformed um, you know, with the appearance of a
mosque for instance, um, they feel uncomfortable with that. So, … less
people would be inclined to defend immigrants who are calling for these
changes.
(P1, FG1)
(105) And it used to be “take over, you know, Muslims will come and they will
take away our strong catholic.. And everything…” They take…
(P3, FG3)
(106) Yeah, yeah, yeah, that’s what they do all the time. We’re not against
muslims, we’re against Islam as a religion or whatever…
(P2, FG3)
Overall, collectively looking at these points raised by our interviewees, what
seems to be the underlying cause for the notably different perception of—and
attitude towards—the LGBTIQ and migrant minorities is a strong and rather
homogeneous sense of social identity that the Maltese appear to have; a social
identity that ﬁlters migrants (or to put it more aptly, some particular groups of
migrants) out and retains the LGBTIQ community as part of the Maltese in-group.
Given that “one’s social identity is a product of the social relations one is embedded
in” (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002: 132), this is not entirely surprising, if one
takes into account the extremely small size of the country and the additional pre-
mise that “in Malta there has been a historical fear of invasion by non-Europeans
and non-Christian people that has lasted throughout the centuries” (van Hooren
2015: 91). That said, not all is lost on this front, since, by deﬁnition, social identities
are “processes of continuous ‘re-writing’ of the self and of social collectives” (van
Houtum and van Naerssen 2002: 132). Thus, it seems that the more the Maltese are
exposed to multiculturalism, as they have increasingly been in recent years, the
harder it will become for them to tolerate xenophobic speech altogether.
4.6 The Conceptual Contiguity of Race and Religion
Fabienne H. Baider, Anna Constantinou and Anastasia Petrou
When referring to religion in the context of hate speech in the EU these days,
Islamophobia inevitably comes to mind. In the particular setting of Cyprus, where
religion is a central part of the collective identity, it seems to be a major factor in
most processes of Othering, sometimes even trampling on other criteria, such as race
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or ethnicity. During the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. interviews in Cyprus,12 interviewees had to
react to our online questionnaire results that included online comments like ‘This is
the race that needs to be annihilated from this planet. Shh’ and ‘Only a dead Muslim
is a good Muslim’. And what their reactions revealed is that, in their mind, Islam is
predominantly confounded with a particular ethnicity: that of the Turks.
Our present analysis is grounded on the concept of salience (Giora 1997, 2003),
which is often described as the primary contributing factor in the production and
interpretation of lexical units and phrases. Since “salient meanings are processed
automatically […] irrespective of contextual information” (Giora 2003: 24, our
italics), salience is linked with the relative importance of a concept in a language
user’s memory.
A particular meaning’s salience can be assessed on the basis of various factors,
such as frequency, familiarity, conventionality or prototypicality. According to
Giora, it is familiarity that plays the most important role, when it comes to making a
semantic unit accessible (2003: 23), but in studies examining the common ground on
which a community builds expectations, judgments and attitudes, frequency was
also shown to be equally important (cf. Baider 2013). That is why, we will be
employing the criterion of frequency as the main identiﬁer of salience in this section.
Using the freeware concordancer AntConc,13 we identiﬁed the most frequent
lexical units across our interview transcripts (Table 4.1).
What was striking was that while the lexical unit ‘race’ appeared, quite
expectedly, high on the list, the lexical unit ‘religion’ did not only achieve a
Table 4.1 Most frequent
lexical units in the Cypriot
interview transcripts
Total no. of word types: 1774
Total no. of word tokens: 17,337
1. 21 158 People
2. 34 99 Believe
3. 36 93 Think
4. 37 71 Race
5. 55 62 Religion
6. 64 51 Cyprus
7. 72 44 Sexual
8. 95 33 Community
9. 96 33 Threat
10. 98 32 Marriage
11. 103 31 Nationality
12. 105 30 Cypriots
13. 106 30 Gender
1220 individual interviews, predominantly with Greek Cypriot participants, were carried out by our
partners in AEQUITAS. Further interviews have been being conducted by the UCY team with
members of the LGBTIQ as well as the migrant communities so as to balance out our sample, but
we have not taken them into account in the present analysis.
13http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/.
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comparably high frequency, but also mirrored ‘race’ in syntactic and semantic
contiguity, i.e. in most cases where the word ‘religion’ was mentioned, reference
was also made to ‘race’ in the same participant turn.
Having identiﬁed the most frequent lexical units and the pattern that this section
focuses on, we needed to analyse the meaning of ‘race’ and ‘religion’ in context.
To do so, we implemented the notions of semantic preference and semantic pro-
sody, as these are found in Bednarek (2008). In order to search for the semantic
preference of a lexical unit, we considered the most common collocates found in its
co-text, while we turned to the axiological value of its context of use (e.g. positive,
negative, etc.) to identify its semantic prosody, that is, the typical ‘tone’ of the
textual passage in which the word is used. For example, in interviewee reactions to
the comment “This is the race that needs to be annihilated from this planet. Shh,”
the semantic preference for words related to the Turkish nation is overwhelming,14
while the semantic prosody is deﬁnitely negative, as manifested by the use of
lexical items like ‘thief’, ‘imprisoned’, ‘clashes’, ‘bad thoughts’:
(107) Well, because we live in Cyprus I think any person would expect this kind of
comment. I mean we’ve seen throughout the history clashes between the
communities of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots
(Interviewee 16)
(108) Having in mind that someone is from a different race, we automatically
have bad thoughts about them. For example, when I hear that a person is
Turkish, I automatically, in my mind, think that he is a thief, yes, this is what
I believe hate speech is…
(Interviewee 15)
(109) It’s not acceptable … I don’t think it’s right, because perhaps we have
“hate” against Turkish people because they imprisoned our island, and
against some foreigners who work in our country and as a result we don’t
have jobs.
(Interviewee 18)
Notably, the lexical/semantic contiguity of race and religion (examples 110 and
111) runs parallel to the lexical/semantic contiguity of Turks with fanaticism and
Muslims with terrorism, as seen in examples (112) and (113) respectively, which
suggests that such contiguities create a vast amalgam, or ‘reference chain’ of
stereotypes; a point acknowledged even by some interviewees, as in (114):
(110) [Discussing the deﬁnition that equates hate speech with insults]
Generally yes, but as I told you I don’t care what the race is, [I care] only
about religion.
(Interviewee 21)
14When asked “Which race do you think this comment refers to?”, several interviewees imme-
diately hypothesised it was “The Turks.” On some occasions, even the interviewers themselves
assumed the same.
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(111) [Discussing hate speech/hate crimes in relation to Muslims that live in
Cyprus]
Interviewee We have some differences, because of religion.
Interviewer Were you or do you know a person that was a victim of hate
speech?
Interviewee Yes many people.
Interviewer Can you tell us an example or two that you personally know?
Interviewee Yes, I heard many times in schools these threats that occur. If
a kid is different.
Interviewer Different from a different race?
Interviewee Yes different race or another sexual orientation.
(Interviewee 16)
(112) I believe that it’s a bad race [the Turks]. Perhaps not all of them, but most
yes.
(Interviewee 18)
(113) Interviewer You said there is fanaticism [of them against us] that is
developed from a very young age.
Interviewee Yes, but it’s the same from our side, and it’s something that I
don’t think can be ﬁxed.
(114)
(Interviewee 18)
I think these results [in relation to the comment “Only a dead Muslim is a
good Muslim”] make sense, if we take into account the Cypriot history;
because I think most people do just that. When most people hear talk about
Muslims, they think one is talking about terrorists. Basically, they don’t
know that Muslims also have a problem with terrorists too. And all this is
also associated with Turkey, because of the invasion, and they don’t see
Muslims as individuals.
(Interviewee 16)
It, therefore, seems that, much like race, our interviewees also take religion to be
a fundamental element of an individual’s identity, which may not deﬁne him/her as
a person, but will at least deﬁne the relationship they will have with him/her. In
example (115), a member of the Christian Arabic minority, called the Maronites, is
described as being the victim of threats and abuse, only because of his or her
religion:
(115) Interviewee In my class we had a Maronitis, they are a minority in Cyprus.
They were the black sheep of the class. There was hate speech
and threats and what we mentioned above.
Interviewer What threats did that person get?
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Interviewee ‘Don’t sit down to eat with us because we will beat you’, that’s
a threat. An insult: ‘you Maronitis leave from here!’, ‘You were
baptised with the lard of a hog, not with holy water’. It’s an
insult that insults traditions and generally their religion as a
Maronitis.
(Interviewee 13)
At the same time, and quite paradoxically, despite asserting that they customarily
judge people by their religion, most of the interviewees also noted that religion is
somehow the source of all evil. Indeed, in reference to religion, the semantic
prosody is extremely negative, as manifested by the use of lexical items like ‘fa-
naticism’, ‘stereotypes’ or even ‘war’:
(116) [Discussing the comment “Only a dead Muslim is a good Muslim.”]
Of course, to my mind, the number of people who said that this is somewhat
acceptable is not that high, if on considers that, in the Cypriot community,
we are very fanatical towards our religion. After all, many crimes were
committed in the name of Christianity.
(Interviewee 19)
(117) [Discussing who’s responsible for negative stereotypes]
Interviewee 6 At home, it’s the parents.
Interviewer Before you also mentioned the church.
Interviewee 6 Yes! Because even in Religious Studies class, we are not
taught about all religions. I think all students should learn
about all religions, so that they can choose [which to follow].
(Interviewee 6)
(118) [Discussing the compulsory Religious Studies unit in state schools]
Religious studies is a good fairytale, but it does not stop creating problems.
If we take a look at history, all wars have began because of religion and its
squabble. I believe there are more important courses that could be taught at
school than Religious Studies.
(Interviewee 17)
All in all, it is well known that foreign presence can challenge social values and
collective beliefs. In this context, gut reactions, like racist statements and social
exclusion practices can be interpreted as signs of a community that feels as if it is
politically, socially, and psychologically under siege. And while our interview
analysis showed that the youth in Cyprus may be prone to confounding race with
religion, it also revealed, surprisingly, a pretty extreme self-deprecating attitude,
that can be easily summarised in the following two characteristic comments pro-
vided by our interviewees:
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(119) This is Cyprus, and no matter how many years pass by, we will still remain
idiots
(Interviewee 14)
(120) We are a little behind other European countries in our mindset.
(Interviewee 17)
The use of the pronoun ‘we’ in cases like the ones above does not seem to be
self-referential, since these opinions were expressed by the most liberal intervie-
wees in relation to those questionnaire respondents who found phrases like “Only a
dead Muslim is a good one” acceptable. It thus looks like the ofﬁcial political divide
hides a social one as well.
4.7 Hate Speech and the Communication Medium
Ernesto Russo and Valentina Oliviero
The fundamental role of the communication media in our society, given their
influence on the form and content of the information we have access to is under-
lined by McLuhan, in his famous statement that “in a culture like ours […] the
medium is the message” (McLuhan 1964: 28). So, since the personal and social
consequences of our communication are the result of the speciﬁc means we use,
modern ‘automation technology’ should bear prime responsibility for the meaning
that it communicates.
During the interview stage of our research in the framework of the C.O.N.T.A.C.
T. project,15 one of our aims was to understand how the Italian youth read and
interpret the information they come across online. In this section, we will briefly
report on how our interview participants reacted when faced with potential online
hate speech, as this was present in three comments to newspaper articles that were
included in the Italian C.O.N.T.A.C.T. questionnaire, while focusing on the role
that they attribute to the media in relation to this issue.
The ﬁrst comment we will discuss here followed an article about the arrival of
refugees from Africa and the Middle East on the Italian coast:
(121) Vanno rimpatriati in massa, salvo i pochi con diritto d’asilo. Se no è una
invasione (e, ancor peggio, in gran parte una invasione di musulmani, che
portano una religione e una cultura pericolose e violente). L’Europa non
deve e non può tollerare invasioni.16
15Within the remit of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project, we ran one focus group with 13 participants in a
youth centre in Rome, and 7 individual interviews. The present section is based on the focus group
interview, as at the time of writing the individual interviews had not yet been transcribed.
16Comment located at: http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/06/27/news/migranti_alfano_-
117817237/.
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They need to be sent back en masse except those few ones with asylum
rights; otherwise it’s an invasion (and even worst, an invasion of Muslims
bringing their dangerous and violent culture and religion). Europe must not
and cannot tolerate such invasions.
This comment stirred up different reactions among our interviewees. On the one
hand, they condemned what they called a “stereotypical position” which is “radi-
cally underinformed” and, thus, “formed quite superﬁcially” (P2, FG1). On the
other, they acknowledged that such cultural prejudice is very hard to overcome,
unless our educational models change in order to provide us with the right
instruments to do so. Of course the media role was also emphasised as a primary
bearer of such a change, given the way in which it continuously affects the opinion
of people of all ages. More speciﬁcally, they suggested that our society needs a
“new common sense” (P6, FG1), according to which, everybody should have the
opportunity to live without borders. So, rather than giving this particular opinion
any weight, our interviewees swiftly dismissed it as ignorant and an example of an
unacceptable marked stereotype. What they counter-argued was that anyone who
expresses an opinion like this should be reminded that these “poor people” are “just
trying to have a better life” (P3, FG1).
The second comment, which is another example of a xenophobic remark, this
time against the particular ethnic group of Roma people, was a response to an
article reporting the attempted robbery of a jewellery store by a Sinti woman.
(122) Seppellitela in galera e buttate la chiave. Data l’età non dovrebbe avere
ﬁgli piccolissimi che possano farle da scudo. Dimenticavo. Era una rom di
etnia sinti? Ebbene, i sinti sono i peggiori e più pericolosi fra gli zingari
perché sono quelli che più degli altri si sanno mimetizzare fra la gente
comune. In ogni caso sempre ladri e delinquenti rimangono.17
Lock her up in prison and throw the keys away. Given her age, she probably
hasn’t got children who can act as a shield for her. Ah I almost forgot, was
she a Sinti? Well, Sinti are the worst and most dangerous among Roma, as
they can blend in among common people better than others. Anyway,
they’re all thieves and outlaws.
This comment spurred the interviewees’ feeling of disappointment even more.
While acknowledging that the stereotyping of Roma people as thieves is quite
widespread, both in Italy and beyond, they underlined the necessity of focusing on
the act of stealing rather than on the speciﬁc ethnicity of the thief. They then
highlighted the “carelessness and inaccurate attitude of news reports” (P4, FG1);
they underlined the responsibility that journalists and media reporters carry, as far
as the conditioning of the general public’s perception of current events goes,
17Comment located at: http://tv.liberoquotidiano.it/video/libero-tv-copertina/11893443/La-rom-in-
gioielleria–ruba.html.
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suggesting that they continuously report news in a way that “paints certain ethnic
groups, like the Roma, in a bad light” (P3, FG1). So, they suggested that both
online and traditional media need to be controlled more, and that a better moni-
toring mechanism that would “deter them from diverting people’s beliefs into
dangerous territory” (P4, FG1) should be in place. Of course, they also noted that,
apart from the lack of the right instruments or mechanisms in place, it is the lack of
education among members of the public that “leaves the ground fertile for such
opinion conditioning” (P4, FG1).
The last comment we will discuss is a homophobic one, taken from an article
about the pro-civil union and same-sex adoption rally in Italy:
(123) NON MI SEMBRA CHE LA LEGGE SUI «DIVERSAMENTE ORIENTATI
SESSUALMENTE» E LE ADOZIONI GAY SERVANO MOLTO
ALL’ITALIA!!!18
I don’t think that laws on “different sexually-oriented” or gay adoptions are
really useful to Italy!!!.
This comment generated another interesting debate, since the topic was linked to
what our interviewees felt was a change that is needed for the country and its
citizens. Disregarding the marked use of the label ‘different sexually-oriented’ that
echoes the Italian phrase for disabled people (‘diversamente abile’), the group
focused on the political undertone of the commenter’s proposal, justifying it to a
certain extent on the grounds of the ideological radicalisation of the national out-
look on the matter. More speciﬁcally, they claimed that since homosexuality is
invisible—or, even worse, clearly discriminated against—in both the media land-
scape and virtually all the big companies’ marketing campaigns, it is to be expected
that positions like this, which show “Italy’s social decay and fragmentation” (P13,
FG1), are encountered in newspaper comments.
On the basis of this analysis of our focus group interview data, we can draw the
conclusion that our interviewees are not only sensitised in relation to the influence
that the media has on public opinion, but also very critical of it. However, they still
seem to not be completely aware of what hate speech is and how detrimental its
impact on the speciﬁc people targeted by it can be. We suspect that this is because
they are not adequately familiarised with human or citizenship rights provisions,
since their cultural and educational paths have not provided them with the necessary
stimuli that will motivate them to stand up to hate speech. What is clear, however, is
that they do recognise the imperative need to equate the online communication of
ideas and opinions to that found in more traditional media and put both these
venues on the same level, when it comes to policies against hate speech.
18Comment located at: http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/renzi-sﬁda-family-day-no-ai-veti-
sulle-riforme-1230715.html.
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4.8 Hate Speech, Cyberbullying and Online Anonymity
César Arroyo López and Roberto Moreno López
ICTs and internet access are a deﬁning element in the lives of young people. In
Spain alone, daily internet use among young people aged 16–35 is above 90% (INE
2016). The online experience, however, is not always positive, and as some recent
studies indicate, traditional school bullying has taken a leap into the digital world,
to the point that the number of incidents in both settings is practically the same
(Calmaestra et al. 2016).
While it is true that cyberhate, the online variety of hate speech, and cyber-
bullying are not the same thing, as the former targets certain groups on the basis of a
common characteristic and the latter targets individuals usually in the setting of a
particularly community (like a school or a workplace), the two concepts are deﬁ-
nitely intertwined in the mind of young people. Bullying can be deﬁned as “a type
of behaviour aimed at doing harm, repeated over time and occurring in the midst of
an interpersonal relationship characterised by an imbalance of power” (Olweus
1999: 25). Cyberbullying resembles bullying in that it, too, is intentional, aggres-
sive and repeated over time, but with the particularity that those who engage in it do
so through the use of electronic means. As Del Río et al. (2010) note, cyberbul-
lying, as a mode of harassment, has characteristics that make it particularly intense,
like the absence of temporal limits, the imperishability of online content, its
capacity to be instantaneously witnessed by a vast audience and the perceived
anonymity of its instigator. What is more, the consequences of cyberbullying have
been analysed in several studies (cf. Garaigordobil 2011), and their connection with
the effects that hate speech has on its victims is clear (cf. Ayto. Barcelona 2017).
During the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. interviews in Spain,19 as many as six interviewees
directly linked their experiences of hate speech to (cyber)bullying:
(124) Interviewer Have you had any experience with hate speech?
Interviewee 2 Yes, what I said about bullying in the ﬁrst years of high school
with my nose problem, adenoids, they harassed me about my
tone of voice and such things.
Although in the particular case in (124) the motivation for the incident was not
some protected characteristic of the victim, as is typically the case in instances of
hate speech, in other reported cases, the cause of the harassment was precisely that:
(125) Interviewer Maybe it was done to people around you?
Interviewee 4 Yes (…)
Interviewer Did they harass them about something particular or just
because (…)?
19For the purposes of this part of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project we carried out 20 individual
interviews, with young people in the provinces of Toledo and Madrid.
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Interviewee 4 No, it was with me and another girl, no, and also with a guy
who was disabled.
Interviewer Was it because of his disability?
Interviewee 4 Yes
In this respect, our interviewees’ perceptions coincide with research that has shown
that racial and sexual prejudice often appear as causes of cyberbullying (cf. Hoff
and Mitchell 2009).
(126) Interviewer What other reasons do you ﬁnd being used on the Internet that
lead to such comments?
Interviewee 5 Physical appearance, race, homosexuality, culture, there are so
many issues that people are always (…) disability, they chase
those groups a lot, so to speak in quotes, to crush them, and,
really, there is no reason.
A further analysis of the interviews revealed that most interviewees believed that
the main pretext behind both cyberbullying and online hate speech was that per-
petrators take advantage of the perceived anonymity of the internet and therefore
feel free to utter and spread insults, vexations and extreme opinions; things that
might not be as easy to do in the offline world. In the words of one of the
interviewees,
(127) Because they do not really show their face, they are through a screen they
do not give the face and put the ﬁrst thing that occurs to them. When they
are facing you, maybe if you are going to say it, to a friend of you by
WhatsApp or by social networks, you put a thing and if then if you had to
say it to the face, you would not say the same thing or you wouldn’t say it in
the same way.
(Interviewee 1)
So, what is the role that anonymity plays in the spread of intolerance and hate
speech in social networks? In the case that concerns us, that is, of young users who
communicate through the Internet, the perception among our interviewees was that,
simply because it is not face-to-face, much of the communication that takes place
on the Internet is not as ‘ﬁltered’ as it would otherwise be:
(128) For the anonymity or shame of saying it face-to-face and you do it for social
networks then it’s like, I do not know, that we hide, it’s like we put on a
mask and as a carnival you wear a mask and you can do everything you
want. This is the same but over the Internet.
(Interviewee 1)
Indeed, several of the young people interviewed believe that posting anonymous
comments online allows people to openly express intolerance, reject difference and
embrace racism without the social limitations that exist in offline communication.
For example:
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(129) There is less [hate speech] on the street, but I think that this is because of
shame, because he does not like to show his face. However, through a
social network I put it [the comment] on and that’s it. Saying things behind
[other people’s backs] is much easier.
(Interviewee 2)
Current research has shown that there is no single proﬁle of a hater or cyberbully
who is concealed under the cloak of anonymity. Even though there are organised
groups that seek to promote hatred online, in most cases the people that hide behind
hateful or discriminatory trolling messages are not linked to openly intolerant
ideological movements (cf. Isasi and Juanatey 2016), but are instead users who just
do not realise the potential impact of their digital activity, and the effects that it can
have in the offline world (cf. Stein 2016):
(130) Because on the Internet it seems that the thing is diluted, people feel
shielded behind their computer, and I am here in my house in Toledo, no
matter who reads this. The one who reads it will be far away, so nothing
will happen.
(Interviewee 14)
Our interviewees also discussed the impact of hate speech and cyberbullying on
the victim:
(131) Interviewer But in the event that it (hate speech online) takes place how you
think it affects the people who are targeted by it?
Interviewee 3 Well, I suppose that it is bad. Evidently you won’t like anyone
who speaks badly about you. Surely then that, as we are in the
society that we are, will affect your private life. I don’t know, I
imagine, I don’t know what measures should be taken: closing
Facebook or changing names or changing friends on
Facebook. I want to say, I don’t know, or don’t see it in some
way or, I know, I guess it will affect and I don’t know, your
security will not be the same if you are being insulted.
(132) I think so, because they already make comments that can affect the other
person psychologically and physically (…).
(Interviewee 17)
Hatred towards certain groups, which underlies both online and offline hate
speech, can also manifest itself in other modes of expression of violence and
intolerance, such as that of (cyber)bullying. Through their personal experiences,
some of our interviewees showed that the expression of hate is intimately linked to
the experience of (cyber)bullying, and more speciﬁcally, that a person’s identity is
often used by perpetrators as a weapon to exercise (cyber)bullying. Keeping in
mind that (cyber)bullying is typically tied to the school context and considering at
the same time that the educational context should be the primary place where the
causes of violence, intolerance and hatred against those who are perceived to be
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different are dealt with, it just seems sensible to us to propose that more focus is
placed on embracing diversity, implementing a human rights approach and carrying
out activities within the realm of citizenship and intercultural education.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
Fabienne H. Baider, Stavros Assimakopoulos and Sharon Millar
The present volume has explored a number of themes that are inextricably linked to
discriminatory discourse. As made clear from the beginning, its main objective has
not been to provide an exhaustive account of hate speech, but rather to show that
research from the perspective of discourse analysis can shed further light on this
social phenomenon that has, unfortunately, been increasingly gaining momentum
lately. What we hope to have made evident through all the preceding argumentation
is that there is much more to hate speech than meets the eye. This is especially true
in the online setting, which is typically characterised by intense emotional content
and expression, especially when it comes to posts made by the general public in
reaction to current affairs (cf. Yus 2011; Musolff 2017; Santana 2014).
The central objective of this volume has been to show that legislation against hate
speech in the EU may be an effective ﬁrst step towards combatting the phenomenon,
but it might not be adequate on its own to contain the present situation. This is
because hate speech has multiple ways of being expressed. In this volume, we have
identiﬁed several strategies of Othering that can be used to express such an unfa-
vourable position towards members of a minority: categorisation and stereotyping,
hate concealed as patriotism, metaphorical language, sarcasm, allusions and con-
structed dialogue can all be ‘subtle’ ways in which discrimination emerges in public
discourse. And while we are not in a position, as linguists, to suggest that such
strategies belong to the category of prosecutable hate speech, we think that it is safe
to assume that they do form part of what we have dubbed soft hate speech in Chap. 1.
The reason for this is that all these strategies create a fertile ground for hard hate
speech to emerge since they slowly but steadily legitimise discrimination and
potentially even violence against vulnerable groups. As Waldron (2012: 4) puts it,
[the] sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good, and in a good society it is
something that we all contribute to and help sustain in an instinctive and almost unno-
ticeable way. Hate speech undermines this public good, or it makes the task of sustaining it
much more difﬁcult than it would otherwise be. It does this not only by intimating dis-
crimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was
like – or what other societies have been like – in the past. In doing so, it creates something
like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here
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and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the
good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good.
Indeed, in all the national corpora that have been collected for the C.O.N.T.A.C.
T. project, one can see that such indirect means of calling for discrimination against
a minority group are commonly encountered across the board. And even though we
identify them as ‘soft’ hate speech, they may have the same perlocutionary effect as
hard hate speech. To mention an example, well-known conceptual metaphors such
as PARASITES were often used in Nazi speeches with a view to outcasting and
demonising the Jewish community, and have been found to be conducive to the
abhorrent behaviour to which this particular minority group was subjected during
the Second World War (cf. Billig 1977; Wodak and Richardson 2013). Such
metaphors seem to be reworked into apparently ‘mild’ negative qualiﬁcations in our
data too; and although they may seem mild at ﬁrst, they have the potential to lead to
some destructive behaviour too. For instance, in both the Lithuanian and Cypriot
datasets, homosexuals are described as being ‘selﬁsh’ or ‘useless’ in statements that
may seem puzzling at ﬁrst. However, when looking more closely at the relevant
comment threads, these characterisations seem to be based on the assumption that
same sex couples cannot straightforwardly reproduce and therefore do not con-
tribute to society at large. Such statements can be taken to communicate many
inferences, with a simple one being that since same sex couples beneﬁt from the
community in which they live without contributing new members to it, they behave
like leeches, which are after all a type of parasite. Therefore even though the terms
‘leeches’ or ‘parasites’ are not used, similar actions and reactions could emerge on
the basis of such inferences (cf. Baider forthcoming). Working on creating counter
narratives based on these inferences may then succeed to debunk the implied
consequences as well as the fallacies conveyed therein. Clearly, further research
should focus on the inferences that can be drawn from other comments in the
relevant threads and their possible contribution to a potential escalation of violence
in order to test the above hypothesis (cf. KhosraviNik 2017).
Linguistic creativity in instances of both hard and soft hate speech is also a
common characteristic across the board. For instance, we observed in the Italian
data the linguistic and ironic calque of ‘different sexually-oriented’ (‘diversamente
orientati sessualmente’), which echoes the Italian phrase for ‘disabled people’
(‘diversamente abile’), implying therefore that homosexuals are incapacitated in
some respect. Moreover, researchers working on online exchanges among members
of extreme-right groups have noticed that they are often prone to using codiﬁed
language, which will enable them to avoid being tracked by automatic hate speech
detection software: e.g. using ‘juices’ instead of ‘Jews’, ‘jewrope’ instead of
‘Europe’, etc. (cf. Baider and Constantinou 2017). Irony and humour are also sure
ways to get the attention of further readers and build connivance outside the already
convinced circle of followers. In any case, this ‘playful’ dimension of hate speech
would also be well worth exploring; if nothing else, it would enable us to tweak
already existing software for the automatic detection of hate speech so that they also
take such comments into account.
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Apart from the identiﬁcation of this repertoire of strategies, which is arguably
not exhaustive, we have also attempted in this volume to show that the general
public’s perception of what actually constitutes hate speech and how it should be
regulated is far from uniform. So, even though the young people we interviewed
are, quite expectedly, ardent supporters of freedom of expression, they still gen-
erally feel that hate speech is an issue that needs to be combatted. Yet, many do not
seem to be sensitised towards what exactly hate speech is and also justify at times
the negative sentiment of the general public towards a particular minority. To our
mind, this carries two implications. On the one hand, even though the EU is
pushing for the regulation of hate speech at a transnational level, it seems sensible
for it to leave space for each member state to target hate speech within its national
context, with its own particularities and needs. On the other hand, it seems that
while legislation does help, it is not enough on its own to contain the situation, since
most participants in our interviews showed ignorance of the relevant laws and
repercussions for the expression of hate online. What emerged from the interviews,
instead, was that the most effective weapon in the ﬁght against hate speech is
education, broadly construed.
Against this background, when it comes to policy-making, the C.O.N.T.A.C.T.
consortium can therefore make two recommendations. For one, it is necessary to
conduct extensive research on the different forms that hate speech can take, both
online and offline, as well as the underlying reasons for the emergence of such
speech. It may sound banal to point this out, but it is only through the profound
understanding of these reasons in the ﬁrst place, at both the national state and
transnational levels, that effective policies of inclusion can be developed; and this is
something that seems to be often disregarded by those in charge. Then, it is equally,
if not even more important for the general public to develop an awareness on
matters of discrimination. This is something that can only be accomplished through
wide-reaching awareness-raising events, a responsible approach to the relevant
issues by the media, and, of course, the establishment of an agenda that promotes
inclusion and tolerance at all levels of education. The latter has also been pointed
out in a very recent European Agency for Fundamental Rights press release,
according to which, “promoting inclusion and mutual respect through education
and strong positive narratives are essential to prevent incitement to hatred and
counter hate speech in the digital age” (FRA 2013: 1).
In closing, we hope to have shown that linguists have an important role to play in
this picture (cf. Olsson and Luchjenbroers 2013). Since it is intention that lies at the
very core of most legal deﬁnitions of hate speech, contextualising and qualitatively
analysing such speech seems central to not only tackling this complex phenomenon
but also to safeguarding freedom of expression on themany platforms that the internet
offers. We therefore believe that this is an endeavour that can only be accomplished
by encouraging collaboration and constructive dialogue between policy makers, legal
practitioners, linguists and computer scientists specialising in the automatic detection
of hate speech, as well as involving higher education institutions more directly in the
implementation of the relevant EU agency directives.
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